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THE ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL provides a scholarly 
forum for thorough discussion of issues relevant to Christian thought 
and faith, and to the nature and mission of the church. The Journal 
addresses those concerns and ideas across the curriculum which interface 
with Christian thought, life and ministry. 
The primary resource for contributions to The Journal is the Asbury 
Seminary faculty who engage in dialogue with both the roots of our 
religious heritage and contemporary thought. Scholars from other 
academic disciplines and various backgrounds are invited to submit 
articles for publication. 
The positions espoused in articles in The Journal do not necessarily 
represent the views of the editors or of Asbury Theological Seminary. 
Books for review and articles for consideration should be mailed to: 
Eric H. Johnson, Asbury Theological Seminary, Wilmore, KY 40390-
1199. Telephone (606) 858-3581. Manuscripts should be in English and 
typed double-spaced on white bond paper, 81/2 x 11 inches, with an 
accompanying computer disk copy when that is possible. - Sermons, 
poetry and devotional materials are not used. Unsolicited manuscripts 
will not be returned unless a self-addressed envelope with sufficient 
postage is provided. Queries are welcome, and a style sheet is available 
upon request. Modest honorarium payments to authors follow 
acceptance. 
Articles in The Journal are indexed in The Christian Periodical Index 
and Religion Index One: Periodicals (RIO); book reviews are indexed in 
Index to Book Reviews in Religion (IBRR). Both RIO and IBRR are 
published by the American Theological Library Association, 5600 South 
Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637, and are available online through 
BRS Information Technologies and DIALOG Information Services. 
Volumes in microfilm of The Asbury Theological Journal (Vol. 41-) 
and The Asbury Seminarian (Vol. 1-40) are available from University 
Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. 
Articles and reviews may be copied for personal or internal use, and 
permission to reprint all or portions of any of the contents may be 
granted upon request to the managing editor. 
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! Editorial Note 
This issue of The Asbury Theological Journal is dedicated to two highly 
significant professors whose lives have made a lasting contribution to Asbury 
Theological Seminary and whose writings have been prolific and influential 
among students, teachers, pastors and the Church in general. I speak of Dr. John 
T. Seamands and Dr. Herbert W. Byrne, who retire at the end of this academic 
year. 
Dr. Seamands joined the faculty of Asbury Theological Seminary in 1961 as the 
John Wesley Beeson Professor of Christian Missions. He was the founding 
director of the E. Stanley Jones School of World Mission and Evangelism at 
Asbury in 1981. Dr. Seamands served as a missionary to India from 1940 until 
1961 under the board of missions of The Methodist Church. After a highly 
successful ministry as a missionary, Dr. Seamands came to Asbury where he has 
served with distinction for twenty-seven years. He has preached the gospel around 
the world in numerous mission retreats, conferences, universities and churches of 
all denominations. He is particularly noted for his close relationship in working 
with Dr. E. Stanley Jones in the United Christian Ashram movement. His writings 
include eight books in English on various themes as Christian mission, the Holy 
Spirit, daily devotions and Christian biography: The Supreme Task of the Church, 
On Tiptoe with Joy, Pioneers of the Younger Churches, On Tiptoe with Love, 
Around the World for Christ, Power for the Day, The GO of the Spirit is Yours 
and Tell It Well: Communicating The Gospel Across Cultures. Many of these 
books have been translated into German, Spanish and Korean. Dr. Seamands has 
four books published in the Kanarese language of India. His writings also include 
numerous articles and chapters written in edited books. Dr. Seamands has served 
well as a model of a missionary and scholar. His professional career has been more 
than a career; it has been a testimony of conviction and commitment to the 
academic and spiritual dimensions of a divine calling. 
Dr. Byrne came to Asbury Theological Seminary in 1967 as professor of 
Christian education. Prior to that time, Dr. Byrne had served as academic dean at 
Fort Wayne Bible College and Huntington College, and also served as chairman of 
the division of religion and philosophy at Asbury College. His writings are 
numerous, including A Christian Approach to Education, Christian Education 
for the Local Church, Improving Church Education and Motivating Church 
Workers. As an ordained minister of The United Methodist Church, Dr. Byrne 
has been active in the ongoing life of the church in preaching missions, retreats and 
in advancing the educational ministry of local churches. For twenty years, he has 
served Asbury Theological Seminary with distinction. His scholarship and 
personal commitment to the gospel have helped to form the academic and 
spiritual life of many seminarians. His involvement in administrative responsibili-
ties has helped to form the character of several institutions, including Asbury 
Theological Seminary. Dr. Byrne has not only been a professor of Christian 
education; his teaching and life serve as a model to the Church. 
We offer this issue of The Asbury Theological Journal as a festschrift to Dr. 
Seamands and Dr. Byrne. The variety of articles covers apologetical issues and 
missionary-pastoral themes. Some of these essays are written by former students 
and admirers of Dr. Seamands and Dr. Byrne. 
LAURENCE W. WOOD 
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Miracles and Physics 
STANLEY L. JAKI 
The most incredible thing about miracles is that they happen. 
—G. K. Chesterton* 
PRIOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
In writing about miracles it is hardly possible not to think first of David Hume. 
In many quarters he is remembered as the one who had once and for all divested 
miracles of intellectual respectability. Such a reputation is part of the awe in which 
Hume as a man of intellect is still held. Yet, as far as intellectual construction goes, 
Hume himself admitted that his theory of understanding resembled not so much 
an edifice as a heap of bricks.' To his credit he also perceived that his premises 
provided only for one kind of glue, plain sentiment or mere habit, to make those 
bricks stick together into some sort of intellectual framework. About such an 
outcome Hume was both very despondent in his truly philosophical moments and 
also very outspoken. Already his first major philosophical work, The Treatise on 
Human Nature, contains the unabashed declaration, "Reason is, or ought only to 
be, the slave of passions."2 That a leader of the Enlightenment did not rather speak 
of the enslavement of passions to reason may tell something of the true nature of 
the light generated by that much glorified movement. To be sure, by "passions" 
Hume meant a dignified, quiet, urbane comportment, a foremost existential 
commodity in his eyes. Indeed all of Hume's philosophy was meant to be a shield 
against harsh, disturbing truths, especially the ones that bespeak of man's sub-
ordination to transcendental dimensions. He correctly perceived that none of 
those dimensions were a potential threat to a tensionless lifestyle if the idea of God 
were a matter of mere wishful thinking. 
Hume's relentless effort to justify intellectually a Weltanschauung free of 
transcendental constraints was in part a reaction to Calvinist tenets, zealously 
preached in the Edinburgh of his youth, about God's wrath on those He had 
positively predestined to hell. Another source was Hume's own personal make-up 
in which Epicurean traits, as amply revealed by his classic portraits, clearly 
dominated. Epicurus, who figures prominently in the closing section of Hume's 
*The Innocence of Father Brown (1911: Penguin Books, 1950) p. 11. 
Dr. Stanley L. Jaki, a Hungarian-born Catholic priest of the Benedictine order, 
with doctorates in physics and systematic theology, is distinguished university 
professor at Seton Hall University (South Orange, NJ) and the 1987 recipient of 
the Templeton Prize. 
THE ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL VOL. 42 No. 1 1987 
6 Jaki 
Enquiry, was certainly Hume's model in seeking the intellectual grounds for a 
peace of mind which consisted in being left alone by the gods. 3 
Nothing has, of course, ever been so much a threat to that ideal of splendid 
isolation as the One for whom the "Hound of Heaven" is still the psychologically 
most expressive name. 4 Awareness of Him has three main sources of which one, 
moral consciousness or the sense of the holy, affected Hume little if at all. In a 
sense, however civilized, he was a counter image of a Bunyan, a Wesley, let alone of 
John Henry Newman. 5 He did not pretend indifference toward the two other 
sources, one philosophical, the other historical. This is not to suggest that his style 
showed emotional overtones as he went about dissecting the classical proofs of the 
existence of God: the cosmological and the teleological. He skillfully played the 
role of uninterested bystander intent only on incontrovertible verities. He could 
not, however, mask his sarcastic contentment as he completed his picking apart the 
cosmological argument with a celebration of the idea of aborted, incoherent, 
botched-up universes. 6 
That such an outcome was destructive of the notion of universally valid laws did 
not seem to bother him. Nor did he seem to be mindful of the fact that years earlier 
his attack on miracles 7 assumed the notion of immutable laws of nature. He also 
failed to come to grips with the fact that on the basis of the bare inductionism he 
advocated one could never establish the existence of such laws. An inductionism 
severed from metaphysics could not yield that completeness which was meant by 
universally and permanently valid laws. Most importantly, Hume did not offer 
satisfactory explanation of the role he accorded in his philosophy to the 
recognition'of facts. As far as he was a sensationist or empiricist philosopher he 
had to grant equal credibility to the recognition of any fact, usual or unusual. That 
recognition had to be certain, if the philosophy built on it was to give assurance of 
certainty. But as far as he was a genuinely Humean philosopher, who subordinated 
reason to sentiments, he had to part with his professed impartiality vis-à-vis any 
kind of fact, usual or unusual. But partiality for some facts, which meant distrust 
for others, invited uncertainty about all facts. This is why when arguing against 
miracles Hume switched grounds. 8 From a mere probability argument against 
miracles (the trustworthy witnessing of regular recurrences far outweighed that of 
exceptional events) he went on dismissing entirely the credibility of witnesses 
(whatever their number, learnedness, and integrity) on behalf of exceptional or 
"miraculous" events. Behind such a tactical shift there had to be a fundamental 
consideration at play. Hume gave a glimpse of it as in the same context he declared, 
"If the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common 
sense."9 Hume's philosophy in general and his arguments against miracles in 
particular, are pivoted on the meaning he gave to common sense. 
In Hume's century common sense had many champions, the first of them being 
the Jesuit Claude Buffier, today almost completely forgotten. They all believed 
that common sense was the best assurance for certainty about the existence of 
external reality, that is, of objective facts, things, and events. ) 0 That Father 
Bailer's contention had no less an admirer than Voltaire," was not without a 
common though least noted instructiveness. The praises of an unsound philosophe 
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were not the clue toward the best philosophical meaning which an expression, be it 
common sense, was susceptible of. Insofar as it became equated with mere 
common opinion, it certainly had no chance in securing, and certainly not among 
philosophers, a certainty about the reality of objective facts. That a commonly 
shared opinion is a most variable commodity was implied in the phrase, "climate of 
opinion," made popular early in this century by Whitehead, who borrowed it from 
a "seventeenth-century writer" (Joseph Glanvill) without naming him. 12 
A recall of the times which witnessed the coining of that phrase should not 
appear useless for Christian theologians. They all, of course, know that defense of 
miracles has from those times on been an increasingly uphill battle against the 
climate of opinion taken for common sense. But perhaps not all of them are aware 
of the unsoundness of a defense of miracles that seeks an ally in the successive 
climates of opinion, philosophical and scientific. As will be clear later, the present 
status of that defense provides much for a new chapter in a now old story. That 
there will be no end to it may be surmised by those mindful of a biblical phrase with 
a sceptical touch, "There is nothing new under the sun" (Ecclesiastes 1:9). In respect 
to controversies about miracles, history turns out to be once more the past written 
in that present tense in which grammarians have long ago recognized the 
beckoning of the future. 
But there is an additional reason in a paper on miracles and science to go back to 
the past in order to understand the present and be prepared at least for the 
immediate future. The reason relates to the measure to which science contributed 
to the formation of climate of thought--as difficult to escape as the air one 
breathes-:ever since the days of Glanvill. Those days saw the rise of Newtonian 
science with all its dazzling successes that opened unsuspected vistas in man's 
understanding of nature. No less dazzling, though in an opposite or blinding sense, 
were some philosophical presuppositions grafted on that science by men of science, 
Newton included, dabbling in philosophy, and by philosophers with little if any 
expertise in science. 
The chief and strictly scientific lure in that dubious game was the inverse square 
law. Had the seventeenth century not been the age of scientific genius, it might have 
witnessed serious interest in its own immediate intellectual past. As that past was in 
good part a matter of printed record, disregard for it could not be excused with a 
reference to the difficulty of gathering manuscript material, a task difficult even in 
this age of instant copies and tele-copying. Even a cursory reading of the printed 
record in question, say of the works of Kepler, Horrocks, and Hooke, would have 
shown that the inverse square law was not a generalized statement derived from 
individual observations or experiments. Such an interpretation of the provenance 
of the inverse square law would have fitted only the empiricist-inductionist strait-
jacket tailored by Bacon for science as its foolproof method. For that garment, 
which only some foolhardy amateurs cared to don, no scientific genius of the 
century of genius had any use. Certainly not Newton. But Newton was also a 
genius in that he was most unwilling to credit other geniuses. Because of his 
jealousy of Hooke, Newton did not give enough credit to Hooke's ideas on the 
inverse square law of gravitation. 13 To anyone familiar with Leibniz's work, 
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equally suspect would appear Newton's claims about his having been the sole 
discoverer of infinitesimal calculus. 
Newton certainly belied his own overbearing self-centeredness when he voiced a 
twelfth-century statement (resurrected in the seventeenth-century debate concern-
ing old and new learning) that the moderns saw farther because they were sitting on 
the shoulders of giant forebears. 14 Newton certainly had such a giant to help him 
see the inverse square law loom large on his mental horizon. The giant was none 
other than Kepler whose three laws of planetary motion were mediated to Newton 
through a little-appreciated mid-seventeenth-century English astronomer, Jere-
miah Horrocks. Those three laws and Huygens' law of centrifugal force could 
easily be combined in such a way as to yield the inverse square law. 
Whether Newton had performed early enough that elementary algebraic 
operation is disputed. 15 But he did not need to do so in order to convince himself 
about the validity of the inverse square law. As one with keen interest in optics, 
Newton was certainly familiar with Kepler's explicit statements on the decrease of 
light intensity with the square of distance from a point source. 16 Nor could Newton 
be ignorant of the fact that Kepler's own certainty about that law of optics was not 
based at all on observations. Reliable photometry was still two centuries away. 
Kepler's certainty rested on an a priori philosophical assumption about nature. 
According to that assumption space was homogeneous. The spreading of any 
physical effect—optical, thermal or gravitational—in such a space could only follow 
the inverse square law. Those aware of the influence of the Cambridge Neoplaton-
ists on young Newton, with their markedly a priori speculations, and of old 
Newton's divinization of homogeneous Euclidean space as God's sensorium," will 
easily perceive the irresistible attractiveness which Kepler's train of thought had to 
have on Newton. The latter had been fully convinced about the inverse square law 
of gravitation long before he compared the fall of the moon in its orbit with the fall 
of an object on the earth and before he had elegantly derived that law from the 
notion of a central field of force. 
The first important thing to note here is the a priori certainty as the source of 
Newtonian science pivoted on the inverse square law of gravitation. This source 
was duly and quickly overlooked as Newtonian science proved ever more 
successful, but it did not fail to act less potently. Newton could lull himself into 
believing that he was really a "Newtonian" natural philosopher, starting from facts, 
experiments, and observations and never from hypotheses or postulates. Few 
leading men of science have ever indulged in so many a priori hypotheses as the one 
who boasted: hypotheses non fingo. 18 
These historical details about seventeenth-century science will reveal their 
bearing on our topic as soon as one notes the second important point. It is implied 
in the first about the certainty felt on a priori grounds about the inverse square law. 
This chief and spectacularly fruitful law of Newtonian science could easily create a 
most portentous illusion about the status of the laws of nature. Was it not tempting 
to assume that the laws of nature were not only accessible to the human mind on an 
a priori basis but were also ontologically necessary in the form in which they were 
unveiled by a priori reasoning? And, if such was the case, could there be any real 
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need for experimentation? More importantly, could there be any need for a 
Creator if nature necessarily had to be what it appeared to be through that very 
same a priori reasoning? 
Such questions about science as well as natural theology could hardly be 
answered in a clear-cut way in the seventeenth century, a transition from Christian 
to secularized thought. Ambivalence, hesitation, and confusion about these 
questions were everywhere in the utterances of Galileo, Descartes, Newton, to say 
nothing of lesser figures with quite a few divines among them, eager to explore the 
new science for the purposes of theology. 19 As to science, the potential pitfalls were 
in full evidence when Galileo slighted Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbits of 
planets. He did so on the patently a priori ground that the heavenly motions had to 
be perfectly circular, a position which allied Galileo with Aristotle, the cosmologist-
scientist, whom he wanted to vanquish above al1. 20 Descartes could never warm up 
to the indispensability of experiments. 21 Had Newton not been the scientific genius 
he was, his philosophical a priorism (with strong Cartesian touches) would have 
weakened his attention to observational evidence on more than a few occasions. 22 
 He was not attentive at all to a very specific question raised by that evidence. If the 
latter was the ultimate truth about the law of nature, what was the true heuristic 
value of the a priori approach? 
This question might have been definitively answered in the seventeenth century 
had its scientific geniuses not represented a transition between Christian and 
secular thought. The minds of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton were not 
sufficiently Christian to perceive the pseudo-deity (be it pantheism or materialism 
or deism) lurking behind a priori thinking. They were, however, sufficiently 
Christian to give no serious consideration to a world without a Creator. Belief in 
creation thoroughly conditioned their minds to think of nature as suffused by 
reason and law even in that sublunary realm which was a realm of disorder for 
pagan minds such as Plato and Aristotle, whatever their intention to celebrate 
cosmic rationality. But if one was to consider in all its consequences the denial of 
an infinitely rational Creator, could the inference be avoided that in such a case no 
rationality whatever could appear in nature? 
This inference was not broadly recognized even when in the nineteenth century 
the secularization of Western thought began to unfold its full logic. Even such a 
master logician as John Stuart Mill failed to recognize the full implications of his 
own speculation about other worlds where two and two would not necessarily 
make four. 23 For in that case there beckoned the specter of absolute contingentism 
against which Mill's 'god' (half good, half evil) was hardly a logical shield. Mill was, 
however, logical to the point of admitting that Hume's notion of the invariability 
of nature's laws as a refutation of miracles rested on the presupposition that God 
does not exist. For as Mill put it, a "miracle is a new effect supposed to be produced 
by the introduction of new cause...; of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there 
can be no doubt." 24 Even less recognition was given during the nineteenth century 
to the fact that absolute contingentism was but a replay of the occasionalism 
advocated by al-Ashari and Ockham. 
At any rate, was the order of nature provided by absolute contingentism or 
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occasionalism different from that radical form of positivism according to which 
the laws of nature are mere commodious devices created by the mind for its own 
convenience to deal with facts? 25 Scientists, who endorsed that theory, did not do 
so to the logical extent of advocating a closure of laboratories. But this conflict of 
their theory with their practice provided no answer to the question as to why there 
was order in nature, that is, why nature obeyed specific laws. Refusal to anchor 
that order in the Creator could but leave one with the fearful prospect of a radically 
random state of affairs. There stones would not regularly fall, but just as likely 
hang in mid-air or take off unexpectedly in any direction. There it would be most 
unlikely that the hatching of a chicken egg would yield a chick. There a flower 
would perpetuate its own kind only as an exceptional case. In other words, in a 
world severed from its Creator, lawfulness would be the miracle, that is, a most 
unexpected event. 
The foregoing examples are a mere paraphrase of the most incisive pages written 
on the laws of nature. The time, 1908, was the high water mark of the worst 
misrepresentation of science once cast in the mold of scientistic ideology. The 
book, not surprisingly, had Orthodoxy for its title. Its author, Gilbert Keith 
Chesterton, was not a scientist, not even a philosopher of science. 26 But he was 
certainly a thinker most independent of the climate of thought of his time if there 
ever was such a thinker. No such independence was evident in the geniuses of the 
seventeenth century, with Pascal being a major exception. A famous remark of his 
portrayed Descartes as the one who really had no need of God. 27 Pascal could have 
just as well stated the same about Galileo, who could exalt the human mind and 
debase the divine mind in the same breath. As he stated that the human mind was 
the greatest marvel of creation, Galileo also equated human knowledge of 
geometry with that of the Creator. 28 From there it was but a step to deriving 
nature's geometrical structure from the mind. Such a nature soon was seen to be in 
no need either of mind or of God. The perception was achieved just a decade or so 
before science came of age through Newton's Principia. In that perception of 
Spinoza, nature and God were made identical which simply excluded the 
possibility of miracles. 29 Much less noted was the most devastating consequence of 
the Spinozian position. It consisted in Spinoza's thorough perplexity about the 
existence of concrete, specific, limited things making up nature and providing 
science with its subject matter. 30 
To be sure, few at that time, and certainly not the scientists, became Spinozians. 
But whereas there was no pressing need for following Spinoza, the question of 
miracles pressed itself on in the measure in which the laws of nature began to 
appear as subtly ultimate entities. Undoubtedly, Newton was sincere as he assigned 
to God's direct action certain arrangements in the physical realm for which his 
science contained no answer. One such arrangement was, according to Newton, 
the separation of fiery from cold matter, or the separation of celestial bodies into 
stars and planets. 31 His other example, the periodic intervention of God to secure 
the stability of the solar system, made a better known intellectual history through 
Laplace's scientific solution to that problem. 32 It was the history of holes in which 
divines, ready to jump on the bandwagon of science without seriously studying it 
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and unwilling to probe an essentially philosophical question to its very bottom, 
were eagerly locating Almighty God as one busy doing what science could not do. 
Many divines, in fact, lost their faith in miracles as they saw those holes being 
filled up with the relentless progress of science. They turned to an increasingly 
radical reinterpretation of biblical miracles culminating in the exegesis of 
Bultmann and in the philosophy of Ernst Bloch. 33 They might have saved 
themselves from this intellectual and spiritual debacle had they pondered Newton's 
own position vis-a-vis miracles. Newton's unwillingness to admit the reality of 
biblical miracles never cut ice with unbelievers. It was quite possibly a tactic on 
Newton's part to cover up his Unitarianism, which, if discovered, would have cost 
him the Lucasian chair in Cambridge and, later, the Directorship of the Mint. 
Unbelievers could, of course, be but reassured by Newton's categorical denial of 
Christian miracles postdating New Testament times. 34 Clearly, Newton believed 
less in Christianity than he should have and believed more than a Christian should 
in the laws of science and nature. One wonders whether Newton had ever as much 
as suspected the miracle of creation in the beginning that lurked behind each and 
every law of nature, or the miracle of a nature stable in its orderliness. For only 
with an eye on that miracle can the possibility of miracle be raised meaningfully. 
The miracle of creation in the beginning implies, of course, the Creator's 
sovereign freedom to create or not to create. No less importantly, his creative 
freedom is divine also in the sense that the actual universality of things created by 
him is only one of an infinite number of possibilities at His disposal. Such a 
Creator is not contradicting the rationality and consistency of His creation if it 
includes an intellectual and moral realm which the physical realm is to support and 
serve. With such a notion, and only with such a notion of Creator and creation in 
focus, it was natural to say, as did George G. Stokes, a prominent physicist of the 
late nineteenth-century, "Admit the existence of a God, of a personal God, and the 
possibility of miracle follows at once." 35 The contrast could not have been greater 
with Voltaire's often quoted utterance that "to suppose that God will work 
miracles is to insult Him with impunity." 36 The ground for that insult was, 
according to Voltaire, that a miracle meant the inability on God's part to 
accomplish any particular end by immutable laws. The fallacy of Voltaire's 
reasoning lay in his own inability to see in the realm of existence anything but a 
mere clockwork in which there was no room for free beings. Of human freedom, a 
most immediately evident factual experience, he could speak only with the gravest 
perplexity. 37 
Voltaire was not the first or last worshiper of the laws of nature for whom the 
freedom of the will was a source of continual nightmare. One wonders what 
latter-day Voltaires felt on hearing no less a physicist than Arthur H. Compton 
declare that the evidence on behalf of man's conviction to move his little finger at 
will was immensely greater than all the evidence on behalf of Newton's laws. From 
this it followed, according to Compton, that should a conflict arise between our 
sense of freedom and Newton's physics, it is the latter that needed to be revised. 38 
 Recognition of man's freedom means, of course, the recognition of a moral order 
which alone is to be served by miracles. That they were never for entertaining the 
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curious was called to the attention of the Pharisees and Sadducees of all ages by 
none other than the greatest miracle worker of all times, Jesus of Nazareth. 39 
In 1934, when Compton spoke, Newtonian physics had for some time been 
superseded. The mathematical tools of the new physics—quantum mechanics—
were statistical. They were very different, nay irreducible to pure differential 
equations, which are the backbone of Newtonian physics. Those equations are all 
translatable into geometry in which the lines or curves representing various 
parameters are always continuous. (It may be worth recalling that the Principia's 
mathematics were invariably given in geometrical figures equivalent to what later 
became known as differential geometry.) The geometrical continuity implied, in 
principle at least, the possibility of measuring with perfect accuracy the physical 
processes described by those figures. It was at that point that an elementary error in 
reasoning gained currency among physicists who were then readily echoed by 
philosophers overawed by the success of a field they did not really know. The 
possibility of perfectly accurate measurements became quickly taken as the justifi-
cation of ontological causality in physical interactions. The inference was 
equivalent to putting the cart before the horse. Worse, that mistaken philosophical 
maneuver began to function as the exact foundation of the ideology of immutable 
laws of nature, of absolute physical determinism, and of the absurdity of miracles. 
Spokesmen of that ideology were a dime a dozen. Ironically, their self-
confidence and public acceptance reached its peak just in the decades when the 
handwriting became increasingly visible on the superb edifice of Newtonian 
physics. The decades were the ones saddling the turn of the century. 40 The 
moderately comforting aspect of that intellectual debacle was that some prominent 
men of science had not lent their voice to a chorus wholly out of tune with science. 
Henri Poincare, the foremost mathematical physicist of the time, had for all his 
agnosticism the presence of mind to warn that "it is with freedom that one 
demonstrates complete determinism." 41 Philosophers and divines lacking that 
modicum of common sense were all too numerous. Thus E. Goblot, professor of 
logic at the Sorbonne, wrote "All induction rests on the confidence we have in 
determinism. There is therefore in nature neither contingency nor caprice, nor 
miracle, nor free will; any of these hypotheses ruin our mental ability to reason 
about things."42 The only logical merit in that statement was the juxtaposition of 
miracles and free will. A most glaring fault from the logical viewpoint was Goblot's 
reference to confidence, hardly a matter for rigorous logic. Last but not least, was 
Goblot entitled to praise—and to royalties—for his book if in terms of his 
declaration it was a necessary result of his brain mechanism, or more rudely, of his 
nourishment and lodgings? 
Unintended instructiveness is no less glaring in the declaration of the 
philosopher of religion, A. Sabatier, "Miracles have no basis in modern 
philosophy. The method inaugurated by Galileo, Bacon and Descartes gives to our 
thinking a turn which necessarily excludes it." 43 Such a turn could come about only 
through a very selective reading of those three and of others with whose names 
Newtonian science became synonymous. Whatever the inadequacies of their dicta 
on scientific method, those three certainly wanted no part in an ideology restricted 
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to matter and motion. They would have undoubtedly rejected the declaration of G. 
Seailles, a chief late-nineteenth-century spokesman of empiricist and scientistic 
secularism, "By its principles as well as by its conclusions science excludes 
miracles."" The empiricist Bacon's dismissal of miracles as means never used by 
God "to convert the heathen," was still balanced by his emphasis on the evidence 
which an orderly nature brings to its Creator, 45 a position unacceptable to Seailles 
and his cohorts among empiricists. Seailles could hardly be ignorant of Descartes' 
often quoted dictum "God performed three miracles: the creation of things out of 
nothing, the freedom of the will, and the Incarnation." 46 The point, which the 
scientistic antagonists of miracles might have most profited from and which they 
would have most resented, was also already made in Descartes' century and by no 
less a scientist than Leibnitz: "If geometry were as much opposed to our passions 
and present interests as is ethics, we would contest it and violate it but little less 
notwithstanding the demonstrations of Euclid." 47 The pseudointellectual's sneer-
ing at miracles grew into a crescendo in the decades straddling the turn of the 
century when Christian morals, private and public, which Christian miracles were 
to support above all, became for the first time a major target of secularism. 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
But to return to physics, or rather to the momentous turn it took about that 
time. Of the two new branches of physics representing that turn, one, the theory of 
relativity, offered no direct handle on the question of miracles. It has, however, an 
important indirect bearing on it which is worth recalling in a few words and all the 
more so because it is generally overlooked or simply ignored when set forth. The 
theory of relativity was born out of young Einstein's awe for the intellectual beauty 
of Maxwell's equations. 48 Since beauty is inseparable from form, it was all too 
natural for him to be concerned about the distortion of the simple form of those 
equations as they applied to a reference system moving with respect to the 
observer. Einstein's great insight consisted in perceiving that the transformation of 
those equations from one reference system to another would leave intact their form 
provided the speed of light is taken for something absolute, independent even of 
the speed of its source. A quick recall of the fact that the speed of sound is never 
independent of the motion of its source may help one realize the enormity of the 
departure which the Einsteinian postulate of the absoluteness of the speed of light 
represents with respect to Newtonian physics. In the latter, which is rightly spoken 
of as mechanistic physics, the speed of the propagation of any mechanical or 
physical effect is always a function of the speed of its source. That Einsteinian 
relativity is based on the unconditionally absolute value of the speed of light may 
also help one perceive the measure of skullduggery whereby the relativization of all 
ethical and social values is asserted on the basis of Einstein's relativistic physics. 
The latter is the most absolutist physical theory ever proposed. 49 
The foregoing considerations relate to the theory of special relativity which, with 
its uniformly moving reference systems, is a particular case of the theory of general 
relativity. The latter deals with accelerated frames of reference. Since the most 
14 Jaki 
obvious case of acceleration is gravitational motion, it was almost a foregone 
conclusion that Einstein should make an effort to deal with the gravitational 
interaction of all matter. He did so as he presented in 1917 the last of his memoirs 
on general relativity. That memoir was a great first in physics in that it contained 
the first, contradiction-free scientific account of a gravitational universe. 50 The 
importance of this can easily be seen with a recall of the point on which Kant 
staked his critique of the cosmological argument. The point was that science (the 
science of Kant's time as he poorly knew it) provided no contradiction-free account 
of the universe. This is why Kant felt entitled to call the notion of the universe a 
bastard product of the metaphysical cravings of the intellect and, therefore, 
unsuitable to serve as the final and crucial jumping board in the intellectual 
recognition of the existence of the Creator. 51 This objection of Kant continues to 
command credibility only on the part of those unmindful of Einstein's achieve-
ment. The latter should, however, loom large in the eyes of those hopeful about a 
genuine harmony between science and miracles. The latter can rationally be 
discoursed about only if the existence of the Creator and of a moral order 
(inconceivable without Him) are assumed. Einstein's contribution to the scientific 
grasp of the universe should seem therefore of greatest importance. In fact he 
perceived late in his life that his cosmology may be an unintended pointer to the 
One beyond the totality of consistently interacting things which is the universe. 52 
While the indirect support which the theory of relativity brings to miracles 
remains unexploited, quite a vast literature has arisen about the alleged support 
which the other main branch of modern physics, quantum theory, allegedly has for 
miracles. 53 That literature certainly proves the naivete with which theologians try 
to cash in on science even when they are not properly trained in it, or appraise it 
with false philosophical premises. They still have to learn that a wrong starting 
point can only lead to blind alleys regardless of the subject, be it as lofty as theology 
or as down-to-earth as physics. In following up philosophical blind alleys 
theologians have no excuse just because prominent scientists give them the lead. 
Theologians staking their fate and fortunes on the divinity of the Logos, which 
alone makes Christian miracles reasonable and meaningful, should view most 
seriously any misstep in logic, in particular, and philosophy in general. It should 
seem most un-Christian to espouse mental somersaults or plain verbal tricks that 
abound in the literature of the philosophy of quantum mechanics as well as of the 
demythologization of miracles. 54 
As to the philosophy of quantum mechanics, the pattern for somersaulting was 
provided by none other than Heisenberg, one of the architects of quantum 
mechanics and the first to unfold a principal consequence of it. Since its 
formulation in 1927 that consequence has made intellectual history (not 
necessarily coextensive with the history of truth) under the label of the principle of 
indeterminacy or uncertainty principle. A much less misleading label would have 
been the principle of imprecision. For what Heisenberg found was simply that 
measurements of physical interactions involving conjugate variables, such as 
momentum and position, time and energy, will always contain a margin of 
imprecision, which can be significant on the atomic level. (On the level of ordinary 
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perception or macroscopic level, the quantum mechanical imprecision can be 
safely ignored because it is many magnitudes smaller than the probable error 
acceptable for laboratory or industrial practice on that level.) Heisenberg, 
however, jumped to the conclusion that because of the significance of inevitably 
imprecise measurements on the atomic level, the principle of causality should be 
considered as overthrown. 55 
This inference, a sheer non sequitur, was not without an important though often 
overlooked merit. If, indeed, the imprecision in question meant the overthrow of 
causality, the latter could not be salvaged on the ground that the imprecision in 
question is wholly negligible on the macroscopic level of ordinary existence and 
operations. The absence of the ontological factor, causality, in the foundations 
cannot issue in its presence in a superstructure which is their extension. At any rate, 
was Heisenberg right in claiming that there was no causality because of the 
inevitable imprecision of measurements of physical interactions? That question 
should have been answered in the negative. Instead, it was given an affirmative 
answer and to the extent as to become a climate of thought. 56 It was largely 
overlooked that Heisenberg's principle states only the inevitable imprecision of 
measurements on the atomic level. From that principle one can proceed only by an 
elementary disregard of logic to the inference that an interaction that cannot be 
measured exactly, cannot take place exactly. 57 The fallacy of that inference consists 
in the two different meanings given in it to the word exactly. In the first case it has a 
purely operational meaning, whereas in the second case the meaning is decidedly 
ontological. The inference therefore belongs in the class of plain non sequiturs that, 
as a rule, are severely strictured in better-grade courses on introductory logic. 
The alleged demise of ontological causality should have called for a general 
sounding of alarms. For that demise could mean but the opening of a chaotic abyss 
with neither a bottom nor with safe perimeters limiting its extent. A recognition of 
this, coupled with a consistent attention to it, could not be expected either on the 
part of prominent physicists or on the part of those in excessive awe of their mental 
prowess. Einstein's admission that the man of science is a poor philosopher has 
much more to it than meets the eye. He himself failed to suspect this as he lead a 
very small group of physicists who refused to accept the counter-casual twist which 
Heisenberg gave to his principle and which later became the cornerstone of the 
Copenhagen philosophy of quantum mechanics with Niels Bohr and Max Born as 
its chief articulators. Einstein never came to realize fully that his disagreement with 
those two was not so much about causality, which he too equated with the 
possibility of perfectly precise measurements, 58 but with the ontology implied in 
causality, physical or other. It was left for W. Pauli, another prominent physicist, 
to call to this point the attention of Born who grew as much dismayed by his 
inability to convince Einstein as by the cooling of Einstein's feelings toward him. 
But Born could hardly desire much enlightenment from Pauli's scornful remark 
that Einstein's concern for physical reality was not worth more than the medievals' 
debate about the number of angels that could be accommodated on a pinhead. 59 
The inability to articulate the question of ontology underlying the debate on the 
status of causality in the perspective of quantum mechanics took monumental 
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proportion in some lengthy essays of Planck on causality, world order, and 
freedom. 6° Ontology and the consequent distinction of it from the merely 
operational level could hardly emerge on the mental horizon of Planck, a 
professed Neo-Kantian. For him causality was a mental category which did not 
depend at all on the observation of the external world. Within the iron grip of that 
category were, according to Planck, all events, including all mental operations, 
even those of the greatest geniuses. Consequently the freedom of the will as a 
mental decision could be but a practical convenience resulting from the fact that 
our introspection did not permit a fully objective, that is, completely accurate 
evaluation of our motivations. It was that practical impossibility that, according to 
Planck, made even Laplace's superior spirit a free agent. As to the Supreme 
Wisdom or God, Planck refused to discuss whether He too was free only in that 
practical sense, or whether He was not free at all because His nature implied a 
perfectly accurate introspection. 
The word accurate is worth noting because the possibility of accurate, that is, 
quantitatively exact measurements was an integral part of Planck's notion of 
causality. He borrowed it from the physicists' world in which he lived and worked. 
There the notion of causality had been as widely based on the notion of exact 
measurements prior to the advent of quantum mechanics as was the denial of 
causality following the overthrow by quantum mechanics of their practical 
possibility. In a broader cultural consciousness the foregoing shift appeared as a 
departure from a deterministic notion of nature to a non-deterministic one. The 
inference that thereby belief in the freedom of the will received a scientific approval 
was quickly made, and by no less a scientist than Eddington. 61 Much less attention 
was given to his reconsideration of the matter, a few years later, in 1939 to be 
specific, when he declared that his earlier arguments on behalf of the freedom of 
the will on the basis of the uncertainty principle were wholly mistaken. 62 
 References to a new "scientifically" approved approach to the freedom of the will 
kept popping up in the philosophical and theological literature, a story that may be 
worthy of detailed documentation. Philosophers and theologians may not be less 
inclined to learn from the errors of the past than are politicians and scientists. 
That the origins of scientifically-coated rescue operations on behalf of the 
freedom of the will antedate the advent of quantum mechanics shows that 
theologians can be quite naive in trying to cash in on some glittering straws in the 
wind. The simile may seem all the more appropriate because it relates to the 
development of statistical methods in gas theory during the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century. That this development was often appraised well outside 
theological circles as a departure from the deterministic world view is, of course, 
true, but this is not necessarily a guarantee of reliability. As a matter of fact, the 
statistical gas theory was based on a strictly deterministic application of the 
Newtonian laws of motion about the collision of gas molecules taken for perfectly 
elastic and spherical bodies. In such a situation the initial conditions determine 
with complete accuracy any subsequent state, however far removed from the initial 
state. A rigorous interpretation of gas theory did not therefore justify the inference 
that most out-of-the-ordinary configurations were only most improbable but not 
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inherently impossible. They were impossible in the measure in which the initial 
conditions were ordinary or fairly symmetrical configurations or not. When some 
early twentieth-century defenders of miracles reported that "the old rigid system of 
the laws of nature is being broken up by modern science," 63 they were very far from 
reliable scientific grounds which are always very different from current fashionable 
appraisals of the latest in science. The same is true of some scientists who tried to 
discredit miracles by calculating the enormous improbabilities of deviations from 
the ordinary course of nature. The figure 10 1010 given by J. Perrin, a French 
Nobel-laureate physicist, to illustrate the improbability of a tile to deviate from its 
vertical fal1, 64 may impress even the layman by its being incomparably larger than 
all the atoms in the universe and all the microseconds that have elapsed since its 
expansion got under way sixteen billion years ago. 
The super-astronomical improbability of this happening does, however, in no 
way weaken the certainty of that outcome provided the initial conditions are in 
exact conformity with it. But about those initial conditions the scientist could only 
admit his ignorance, although he should have kept in mind that it was that very 
ignorance that prompted him to calculate mere averages. Since the latter were 
useful only for the gaseous state, in which the motion of molecules is extremely 
restricted, the application to miracles was in fact tantamount to specious blowing 
of mere hot air, worthy only of less than average intellects. 
The grafting of scientific respectability on miracles had a far greater appeal with 
the advent of quantum mechanics as it was taken to be equivalent to the 
breakdown.of strict physical determinism. Here again a detailed account of what 
actually happened is still to be written. That there was an early rush of divines to a 
terrain which, as it will be clear later, was a ground where angels would have feared 
to tread, may be gathered from a book of Bernhard Bavink, published in 1933 and 
immediately translated from German into English under the title, Science and 
God. 65 The book was the substance of lectures which Bavink had given in various 
parts of Germany on science and religion. A graduate of the University of 
GOttingen, where he majored in physics, Bavink had a deep interest in theological 
questions. This was almost natural on the part of one who had among his paternal 
forebears Dutch Mennonites and was converted to Lutheranism by his wife, the 
daughter of a pastor. By the early 1930s Bavink had for some years been looked 
upon as a leading Christian interpreter of the relation between science and religion. 
This was due to the half a dozen editions, between 1913 and 1929, of his magnum 
opus that appeared in English translation in 1932 under the title, The Anatomy of 
Modern Science. 66 That miracles and science are not discussed in those editions 
(and in that translation) is an indication of the fresh interest created in that topic by 
the uncertainty principle, still a novelty around 1930 or so. 
In recalling Perrin's calculation of the enormous improbability of a macroscopic 
object, such as a tile, from deviating randomly from its vertical fall, Bavink noted 
that miracles, such as Peter's walking on the water, were macroscopic events where 
the laws of classical mechanics were, with their strict determinism, invariably valid. 
Such was the immediate background for Bavink's warning, "The theological world 
cannot be too strongly warned against attempting to make capital in this way of 
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the new discoveries." 67 
By new discoveries Bavink meant those aspects of modern physics according to 
which the microscopic or atomic level was ruled by chance alone. That chance 
meant for Bavink the absence of physical causality, and not merely our ignorance 
of causes, was suggested by his admission that a world steeped in the haphazard 
may seem much less in keeping with the traditional Christian view of the world as 
thoroughly ordered. Would a world of chance evoke, Bavink raised his typically 
German question, the recognition of the Creator in the same way in which the 
starry realm bespoke to Kant of a cosmic lawgiver? Bavink answered this question 
in the affirmative. His reason was that, after all, nothing happens or exists unless 
God directly brings it about. This meant, in Bavink's resolution of the theological 
question raised by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, that the difference between 
classical physics and the physics of quantum mechanics was very simple. Within 
the former God created the original initial conditions in the Beginning; in the latter 
God keeps creating the initial conditions at every instant and for all events: 
In the literal sense, not a single quantum of action exists in the world 
which does not proceed directly and immediately from God. No 
natural law, not even a statistical one, compels its existence. Such a 
notion is just as meaningless as if we were to imagine that the statistics 
of railway accidents or marriages made one year compel those 
accidents or marriages taking place the next year, to occur. I think that 
the enormous liberation which this insight brings to religious thought 
makes it worth while to accept the apparent chance which it requires. 
For in truth, believers have always hitherto regarded chance as God's 
direct will (Matthew x. 29). This now becomes an evident fact for the 
chance in the final elementary actions of existence is nothing other 
than the completely free decision by God. 68 
None of this should have surprised anyone who had carefully read the first line 
of the paragraph out of which this passage has been taken. There Bavink endorsed 
the "nominalist protests" against classical physics and against the inference that it 
was enough for the regular sequence of physical processes that their initial 
conditions be provided by God. That protest seemed to Bavink so well founded as 
to dispense of the need for going into "any great philosophical trouble of getting rid 
of objections to it." 69 It was, of course, another matter whether it was unreasonable 
to assume that God was capable of creating a physical realm with stable laws which 
He did not have to re-create at every moment but only had to conserve in its 
existence. This age-old Christian distinction between the erstwhile creation of 
things out of nothing and the conservation of the existence of things already 
created did not arise on Bavink's mental horizon. His claim that in the viewpoint 
endorsed by him chance was only apparent, rested on a theology harking back to 
Ockham who sought answer in miraculous interventions by God at every moment 
to essentially philosophical questions. That theology was eager in resorting to 
biblical phrases, such as the one (Matthew 10:21) invoked by Bavink about 
sparrows none of which falls to the ground without the Heavenly Father's willing 
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it. The fact that in many biblical passages the world is spoken of as firmly 
established and that even the endurance of God's covenant is asserted in terms of 
the endurance, stability, and unfailing regularity of his physical creation, 70 did not 
seem to have any relevance for Bavink. 
The problems--scientific, philosophical, and theological--that transpire from the 
few pages Bavink devoted to miracles reappear in one way or another in all the 
subsequent discussions of miracles with an eye on modern physics. That the 
remaining pages will be mostly concerned with two books entirely devoted to 
miracles and modern physics is in part due to their wide availability to English 
readership. Another reason is that their respective authors are both professional 
physicists. One of them, William G. Pollard, is also an Anglican clergyman. The 
other, Donald M. MacKay, showed more than a passing interest in matters 
theological. Most importantly, their discussions are detailed and therefore provide 
their instructiveness in their own terms. 
Pollard would have done better justice to his book had he called it not Chance 
and Providence but "chance is providence" or, perhaps, "chance is your provi-
dence," though not "Providence is your chance." This is not to suggest that by 
Providence he did not mean most emphatically the one portrayed in the Bible. By 
chance he meant the randomness associated with quantum mechanics. He called it 
the "very task" or "primary thesis" of his book to show the full harmony of these 
two viewpoints. 72 It should therefore be no surprise that for Pollard quantum 
mechanics is the last word in physics. Conclusive for him had to be the failures, 
rather numerous by the mid-1950s, of efforts aimed at constructing a quantum 
mechanics with hidden variables, that is, a quantum mechanics which would rest 
on a mathematical formalism allowing for absolute precise measurements in 
principle at least. He undoubtedly found further proof of the statistical character 
of scientific explanation when in the mid-1960s J. S. Bell set forth his famous 
theorem on the impossibility of hidden variable theories. Pollard may have derived 
further assurance when the early 1980s witnessed the completion of experiments 
verifying some consequences of Bell's theorem. 73 Yet, no such theorem or 
experiments would ever dispose of the question whether an operational restriction 
on the precision of measurements is equivalent to an ontological incompleteness of 
the interactions to be measured. To anyone, such as Pollard, not facing up to this 
question, it is natural to state, as he does, that "the world is so constituted that the 
ultimate as well as present characteristic mode of scientific explanation in all fields 
is statistical." 74 (Italics added.) 
Of the three words italicized (above) the first clearly carries an ontological 
meaning. Furthermore, if that meaning is valid, and only then, that is, if the world 
really embodies a basic randomness, the use of the two other italicized words is 
unobjectionable. To Pollard's credit, he is very conscious both of that logical 
connection and of the burden of proof it entails. "In order to establish my primary 
thesis that this is a necessary characteristic of scientific knowledge dictated by the 
nature of things rather than a merely temporary result of inadequate information, 
it is clearly necessary for us to probe much deeper than we have so far." 
Unfortunately, he does not fathom philosophical depths. In the same breath, and 
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elsewhere too, he reasserts the fundamental ontological status of chance in the 
actual world "in which indeterminacy, alternative, and chance are real aspects of 
the fundamental nature of things, and not merely the consequence of our 
inadequate and provisional understanding." 
Ironically, this statement of Pollard is preceded by his dismissal of Einstein's 
disagreement with the celebration of chance on the basis of quantum mechanics. 
Pollard does so with the characterization of that disagreement as a "philosophical 
conviction." Philosophy fares indeed poorly in Pollard's book. Even elementary 
consistency is in short supply in connection with pivotal terms he uses. Thus he 
states about chance not only that "it cannot be the cause or reason for anything 
happening," but also that "chance and probability in modern physics are...real and 
essential elements of the world which it describes." The last statement implies, of 
course, the question of the value of scientific explanation. This crucial, philo-
sophical problem is never met head-on by Pollard as if he had not heard of the 
countless books written on the subject both prior to and after the advent of 
quantum mechanics. Nor is the question, already aired in this paper, about the 
legitimacy of inference from the operational to the ontological, so much as hinted 
at by him. 
As one living in the physicists' world, he should not be too severely judged. The 
scientific community ignored countless warnings concerning that inference. if not 
the very first, certainly the most concise of those warnings was carried to the four 
corners of the scientific world through a letter that appeared in the December 29, 
1930, issueof Nature, the leading scientific weekly. The concluding sentence of that 
letter written by J. E. Turner, of the University of Liverpool, in connection with a 
prominent physicist's popularization of the chance world of atoms, contained 
more depth than much of the literature celebrating quantum mechanical chance, 
"Every argument that since some change cannot be 'determined' in the absolutely 
different sense of 'caused,' is a fallacy of equivocation." 77 
Whether Pollard perceived something of the sadly inadequate character of his 
reasoning on behalf of universal chance is a secondary matter. Nor is one to be 
appalled by the fact that as a scientist he fell completely under the sway of the 
extraordinary successes of quantum mechanical techniques and took them for 
basic and ultimate explanation. The same happened to countless colleagues of his, 
from the most outstanding to the most ordinary. What should seem to be 
especially instructive within the perspective of this paper is that he failed to perceive 
the devastating consequences devolving for Christian miracles from the very 
method he offered as their only safeguard. For underlying that method there seems 
to be a measure of respect for science as it actually is that may undermine science as 
well as miracles (Providence) by the same stroke. Such undue measure of respect 
lurks between the lines as he states about his stated purpose of showing the full 
harmony of providence (Bible) and science (quantum mechanics). It is "to be 
accomplished in such a way that the essential integrity and unity of science, both as 
it is now and as in principle it may become, is fully preserved." 
Undoubtedly a God who created human reason and is Reason himself deserves 
in full that logike latreia which Saint Paul enjoined (Romans 12:1) on Christians 
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and Pollard may have had in mind. Such worship is incompatible with the 
slighting of anything that human reason can safely ascertain. By the same token 
that same kind of worship assumes as verity that there can be no contradiction 
between the historical revelation (be it in words or in deeds) of such God and His 
self-revelation through nature which according to the same Saint Paul (Romans 
1:20) is irrefutably clear, regardless of the resolve of some to ignore it. But the 
non-existence of contradiction between revelation and reason can only be 
established if careful attention is given to the possible sources of a misrepresenta-
tion of either or both. Contradictions are again bound to loom large if reason is 
limited to science, and even more so if the science of the day is taken for Science in 
its ultimate form. Neither science nor Revelation was served whenever God's basic 
way of action was taken to be equivalent to the workings attributed by that science 
to nature. 
The story, several centuries old by now, is replayed with a new twist in Pollard's 
book. The great success of mechanistic or Newtonian science was a powerful 
motivation for casting God in the role of a clockmaker. But those theologians, 
whom Voltaire merely echoed in celebrating such a God, 79 were not eager to 
project him into the Bible. Pollard, however, is most emphatic in saying two things: 
One is that the idea of a God who suspends now and then the workings of the 
machinery of the world is "almost wholly unbiblical." The other is that only the 
notion of a God continually casting dice (that is doing what the chance of quantum 
mechanics is supposed to represent) is wholly and alone biblical. After taking issue 
with those who speak disparagingly of "mere" chance, Pollard waxes dogmatic: 
To Einstein's famous question expressing his abhorrence of quantum 
mechanics, "Does God throw dicer the Judeo-Christian answer is 
not, as so many have wrongly supposed, a denial, but a very positive 
affirmative. For only in a world in which the laws of nature govern 
events in accordance with the casting of dice can the Biblical view of a 
world whose history is responsive to God's will prevail." 
Before considering the allegedly biblical character of a dice-throwing God it 
should be worth considering the dice in question. Nothing would be more 
mistaken than to think of an ordinary die. The latter has six faces, eight corners, 
twelve edges, all definite parameters with such others as specific weight, elasticity, 
temperature, and so forth. Were God to be using such a die He would have to 
throw it but once. Its first and all subsequent bouncings off from a specific ground 
would strictly follow from the initial conditions of the first throw that could be 
known to God with complete accuracy. Nor would the case be any different were 
the various parameters of the die subject to statistical variations. What had already 
been said about statistical gas theory would apply here too. There one would still 
be within the framework of classical or deterministic physics. While we humans 
can only start from an average value of the parameters, to God all the individual 
cases of possible variations would be equally known and also their actual sequence 
as fully determined by the initial conditions. 
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Quite different would be the case of God throwing a quantum mechanical die. 
The latter, radically different from the ordinary die, would display a random 
variability in the actually existing number of its parameters such as faces, edges, 
corners, etc. This has to be so as long as one does not disavow the very core of the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, the logical somersault 
according to which an interaction that cannot be measured exactly cannot take 
place exactly or rather can take place only with an ontological defect in it. Instead 
of measurement one can, of course, refer to what it presupposes, the specification 
of parameters needed to carry it out. The necessary incompleteness of those 
specifications means, according to the Copenhagen philosophy, an ontological 
incompleteness. 
To supply that defect the Copenhagen camp or the overwhelming majority of 
physicists invokes chance or, as will be seen shortly, their short-sighted wizardry 
with mathematical operators. A theologian-physicist like Pollard, with equal 
allegiance to both of his professions, will of course invoke God in addition to 
chance. The result is that all events in the physical realm (where all events are 
ultimately chance events according to the Copenhagen philosophy) become so 
many direct events actually performed by God, who alone can supply all 
parameters of the die which are (partly or entirely) unspecifiable by quantum 
mechanics and therefore (partly or entirely) non-existent according to that 
philosophy. If, however, such is the case, all natural events become miracles and all 
miracles become strictly natural events. 
To his credit, Pollard minces no words: "It is an error to think of a miracle as 
being 'unnatural.' " (According to him only the moral significance attributed by 
the faithful to very rare events turns them into miracles.) 8 ' To be sure, in another 
passage he restricts that sweeping statement to the "majority of biblical miracles." 
They "are the result of an extraordinary and extremely improbable combination of 
chance and accidents. They do not, on close analysis, involve, as is so frequently 
supposed, a violation of the law of nature." 82 He thinks that in such a way all 
miraculous healings listed in the New Testament are accounted for. As for 
large-scale nature-miracles, such as the one connected with the Exodus, they are 
still but natural coincidences for him. His exegesis is, of course, a rehash of ideas of 
liberal Protestant and modernist divines. He seems to follow them too as he 
ascribes most biblical miracles to the hunger which "late elaborators" of those 
stories had for the miraculous. 83 In fact he retains only three events as miracles: the 
creation of all, the Incarnation and Christ's Resurrection. 
But is there a logical way of saving the reality of these three miracles while 
turning the Gospel account about many others into morality tales however 
exalted? One wonders whether Dr. Pollard thought of the price paid by so many 
liberal theologians for their being ashamed of miracles as so many violations of the 
"sacred" laws of physics. Their fate is grippingly mirrored in the spiritual odyssey 
of Leo Tolstoy who took them for a guide. With his genius of a writer he could 
portray grippingly their starting point as well as their state in the end. The former is 
succinctly given in the precept laid down in a notebook of his where the effort "to 
reinforce the teachings of Christ with miracles" is declared to be equivalent to 
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"holding a lighted candle in front of the sun in order to see better." The end is 
illustrated by Tolstoy's harmony of the four gospels with so many passages cut out 
from the originals as to make a major biographer of his speak of it as "the Gospel 
according to St. Leo."'" Better known is Tolstoy's novel, Resurrection, in which 
Christ's rising from the death is turned into a mere myth, shared, of course, 
communally. 
Almost a hundred years later the Anglican bishop of Durham, Dr. Jenkins, 
served memorable evidence that the principle of demythologization inevitably 
turns, in the hands of a consistent devotee to it, the Gospel account about Christ's 
resurrection into a symbolic communal expression of hope in eternal life. Pollard's 
caveat that the Resurrection of Christ is an individual event and therefore cannot 
concern science, that is, quantum mechanics which deals with aggregates of events, 
is wholly beside the point. Christ's bodily resurrection does not come under the 
competence of quantum mechanics because it is a macroscopic event, though, in its 
terms, it would still ultimately he a chance event for which Pollard should have 
invoked God as the One who supplied ontologically, though "randomly," the 
parameters that would not be specified by quantum mechanics. Nor is this the 
place to deal with Pollard's view that the ultimate truth of miracles rests with the 
faith of the community which endows a very rare event with a -religious signifi-
cance. Here let it suffice to say that such a falling back on communal faith would 
force the Christian to abandon the biblical injunction in terms of which he has to 
render a fully reasoned account of his faith and comportment. The same tactic also 
deprives him of the possibility of challenging on a rational ground others not 
sharing his faith. They--agnostics, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Marxists, or 
Voodooists—are given by that tactic the same right to rest their case ultimately on 
their respective shared "faith." Clearly, what Pollard offers as a rational defense of 
Christian miracles is in fact a fearsome boomerang depriving that defense of all 
rationality. 85 
The disservice which Pollard's explanation of miracles does to Christian faith 
derives ultimately from a distortion of the biblical portrayal of God's relation to 
the physical world created by Him. Of that relation Pollard mentions only God's 
full sovereignty over nature and His most intimate involvement in all its events. He 
is silent about another no less noticeable aspect of that relation, namely, the 
constancy, endurance, stability, lawfulness and consistency of the universe and its 
parts. As was already noted, the importance of that aspect is nowhere revealed 
more powerfully than in passages in which God's faithfulness to his covenant with 
David is supported with a reference to the faithfulness and stability with which the 
physical world created by Him follows its course and endures. 
That the biblical world view implies regularity and constancy was briefly 
recognized by Donald M. MacKay, author of the other book to be considered 
here." He did so, however, in a way that runs the risk of destroying the natural 
knowability of those two cosmic qualities. The stability of the solid contents of the 
world is, according to MacKay, declared in the Bible: 
to he a dynamic, contingent, stability. It is only in and through the 
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continuing say-so of their and our Creator that they cohere or "hold 
together." He is the giver of being, moment by moment, to all the 
events in and through which we encounter the world of physical 
objects... But however uncompromisingly realist its tone, the Bible has 
no room for the idea of matter as something eternally self-sufficient or 
indestructible. The Psalmist may praise God for the stability of the 
earth and the reliability of the normal links between events on which 
our rational expectations are based, but the same Book of Psalms 
speaks of a time when the earth and the heavens will perish and will be 
changed "as a vesture" at the will of their Creator. In the end, for 
biblical theism, the only solid reality is God and what God holds in 
being. 87 
What this account leaves out of consideration is whether all those beings are 
kept by God in existence from moment to moment or are created anew out of 
nothing at every moment. MacKay's inveighing against what he calls the Greco-
Medieval view of the cosmos consisting of "necessary natures" known by a priori 
reasoning is part of that partial vision. 88 It suggests that he cannot or is not willing 
to conceive of a "nature" which in itself is only one of the niany possibilities 
available for God's creation but which by being a "nature" assures that it is 
maintained by God in existence in conformity to it. MacKay's oversight of the 
medieval philosophical and theological thinking (so critical of the Greeks on at 
least three crucial points) as the spark of the rise of modern science 89 is a corollary 
of his broader and distinctly Calvinist (Ockhaniist) perspective. 
This should be no surprise. From the moment Calvin (or Ockham) rose against 
apostolic succession, they rose against ecclesial or sacramental continuity across 
time. To buttress philosophically their break with historic continuity they were 
instinctively pushed toward a world view steeped in discontinuities, that is, toward 
a Nature without "natures." No wonder MacKay is pushed by the logic of his own 
position to asserting that continuity and objectivity in nature can only be known by 
one's surrendering to biblical revelation, or rather to MacKay's reading of it. Thus 
in discussing the lure of quantum theory, which challenges the distinction between 
the observers and the observed, and the lure of relativity theory, which challenges 
the validity of a single description of the world valid for all observers, MacKay 
concludes: "True our Christian scientist in God's world may have no access to the 
Creator's eye view of his situation; but because he knows that he is under judgment 
by that criterion, he is saved from the trap of confusing relativity with a denial of 
objectivity."" 
It is the same condition of standing under the judgment of biblical revelation as 
he interprets it that saves Mac Kay's believing scientist from the pitfalls of quantum 
theory. This declaration of MacKay is all the more instructive because he does not 
invoke revelation or biblical perspective as an indispensable ground for recogniz-
ing that Einstein's opponents "had no rational grounds for claiming that the 
absence of an observable causal precedent for an event meant that it had no causal 
precedent." 91 But no sooner had MacKay seemed to sight the ontological 
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perspective of the problem, he lost sight of it, or perhaps he deliberately tried to 
cover it up with a theological smokescreen which is, however, rather transparent. 
For the question is not whether God can play dice in a manner worthy of Him. The 
question is once more about the way in which the parameters or details that cannot 
be specified by quantum mechanics become presently existing in order to let things 
go. MacKay tries to resolve that question on the basis that God is most directly 
involved in all events as a Sovereign Lord over all his creation. But in doing so he 
merely sidesteps the problem which once more surfaces as he states: "From a 
biblical standpoint it would be equally mistaken to argue that if there were no 
causal precursor for an event, then its Creator must be thought of as 'playing 
dice.' "92 For the absence of a causal precursor, or even the partial absence of such 
a precursor, is an ontological gap. Does it fall upon MacKay's "biblical God" to fill 
that gap with continual instantaneous creations? That such is indeed the thrust of 
MacKay's reasoning may be surmised from his further talking around the problem 
without being ready to meet it head on: 
The God of biblical theism is beholden to none to account for his 
creative agency. If he freely wills into being a succession of events in 
which one half of the sub-microscopic details at any time are 
unspecified by their precursors, this would involve no inconsistency 
with his character, still less with his sovereignty, as portrayed in the 
Bible. Belief in a sovereign God does not in the least entail a belief that 
there must be "hidden physical variables" sufficient to determine the 
beh-aviour of electrons on the basis of precedent. For biblical theism all 
events, equally, with or without precursors according to precedent, 
need God's say-so in order that they occur at all. The choice of "God or 
Chance" is simply not a meaningful alternative, if "Chance" is meant in 
the scientific sense. As the Book of Proverbs (ch. 16, v. 33) has it: "The 
lots may be cast into the lap, but the issue depends wholly on the 
Lord."93 
Whatever the appropriateness of that particular biblical passage, MacKay's 
banking on God's sovereignty seems to be very inappropriate. The issue is not that 
God is sovereign but whether He is at least as rational as human beings are. The 
latter can clearly recognize the difference between being and non-being. It is that 
difference which is the real issue concerning the theory of hidden variables. 
Whether most professional supporters and opponents of that theory have realized 
this is irrelevant. As was already stated, physicists have for centuries been apt to 
limit their vistas to quantitatively exact measurements and this is why they have 
taken it for mechanical (and implicitly for ontological) causality. Insofar as hidden 
variables have an ontological relevance, the biblical God, whose self-revealed 
name I AM WHO I AM is ontology incarnate, 94 is bound to provide them in one 
way or another. MacKay seems to suggest that He does so by continually creating 
out of nothing at least one half of the ontological specifications of all atoms to fill 
the ontological gaps created by quantum mechanics or rather by its Copenhagen 
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pseudo-philosophy. 
In a manner characteristic of the entire Ockhamist tradition that heavily 
conditioned the Reformers' theologizing (for all their dislike for philosophy), 
MacKay goes straight to God's sovereignty as if this could dispose of a plain 
question whether the existence or non-existence of certain things is meant by some 
staple phrases of quantum mechanics. No wonder that he sees but the veneer of the 
fallacy of setting up Chance as a kind of anti-deity standing for chaos and absence 
of meaning. 95 He fails to see that the basic issue about chance is whether it can be a 
substitute for reality, be it the reality of physical parameters that "do not exist" 
because quantum mechanics cannot specify them. Understandably, MacKay did 
his utmost to make it appear that his train of thought did not force him to charge 
God with the task of supplying the reality of those unspecified parameters with 
special creative acts performed every split second. His fellow scientists would have 
been taken aback, though not for the right reason. The latter, not a matter of 
theology but of plain philosophy, could not, however, be seen by the ones who had 
bartered sound reasoning about reality for the hollow glitter of mathematical 
operators which give no certainty about anything real, let alone about miracles and 
Providence in human history. 
PERENNIAL PERSPECTIVES 
Certainty about real events or things, usual or unusual, can never begin with 
science, and not even with "the Lord's quantum mechanics" 96 as Schrodinger once 
spoke in quasi-mystical awe of his own specialty. Science rather presupposes real 
things in order to ascertain their quantitative properties; it cannot provide any of 
those uncountable things. Of course, nothing reveals so forcefully the reality of 
things as their limitedness which has many quantitative components. But whether 
they, or the things in which they are embedded, do exist or not is not a scientific 
question. Being a question about the real, it cannot be answered except by a 
philosophy which provides the perennially proper place for the question. To be 
sure, even idealist philosophies make claim to reality, to say nothing of the 
philosophies known as rationalism, empiricism, sensationism and pragmatism. 
They all claim to be the place for the real. But not the proper or primary place. 
They are indeed betrayed by their labels, which are almost always the choice of 
their chief articulators. Those labels invariably relate to an aspect of the real insofar 
as it can be conceptualized, sensed, tested, manipulated and so forth. 
None of those philosophies would carry their special labels if the very start of 
their program and method would be an unconditional acknowledgment of 
external reality. Only that acknowledgment is a guarantee of its being known with 
certainty. This may appear a kind of plain arguing in a circle. Actually, it is the only 
starting point which can save one from arguing ever in such a way. It is a 
consciously and methodically-taken starting point. A chief recommendation of 
that method is that all other philosophical approaches to knowing the real with 
certainty have turned out to be so many seeds of doubt about reality or means 
whereby the thinking man found himself cut off from the external world. Cartesian 
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rationalism that aimed at complete certainty (equating it with mathematics which 
is a series of tautologies, however useful) led to Spinoza's perplexity about any and 
all finite real things. 97 Francis Bacon's empiricist "instauration" of a new age in 
thinking revealed in Hume's hands the fragmentation through it of all judgment 
about reality. Kant's effort to restore certitude through the a priori character of 
mental categories led in Fichte's hands to the exaltation of the will and, in Hegel's 
hands, to the divinization of the individual ego, the least reliable commodity one 
can think of. The sensationism advocated by Mach locked him in solipsism which 
is undoubtedly the highest conceivable measure of certainty although not 
communicable. As to pragmatism, its chief spokesmen, William James and John 
Dewey, would in vain try today to disavow the uncertainty which it has generated 
about everything except, of course, one's selfish and all too often very transient 
success. 
The other chief recommendation for taking the certainty of knowing external 
reality for the starting point in all philosophy is that any refutation of it implies 
knowledge of that type. Thus to argue that a specific registering of a fact, thing, or 
event was a mere hallucination, one must assume that it is possible not to be under 
its influence in registering this or that fact. The same holds true about the argument 
based on any partial deception or error of one's senses or on any exaggerated claim 
about the extent of one's observations. Those "critical" philosophers who have 
succeeded in spreading the belief that nothing can be known unless first critically 
proven have in fact assumed this very knowledge without first critically proving it. 
Moreover, just as colors cannot be discoursed upon in terms of non-colors, the 
knowledge of external reality cannot be proven in terms of knowing only one's 
mind, "critical" or not. 98 
This is basically all that is needed to show the certainty of facts called miracles. 
The all in question may sound very little, but actually it is co-extensive with that 
largest entity called the world of the real, and also co-extensive with all reasoned 
discourse relating to it. In a sense that all is very restricted as it is ultimately reduced 
to the evidence of one's unaided senses. This may appear ridiculously little in an 
age of science that probes such realms of the very small and the very large that are 
inconceivably beyond the reach of the senses. It should not, however, be forgotten 
that the ultimate certainty of all the esoteric findings of science in the farthest 
reaches of space and in the deepest layers of matter rests on the reliability of the 
senses that register the position of ordinary pointer needles. This is what no less an 
"idealist" physicist than Eddington recognized when he stated that "molar physics 
has the last word in observation for the observer is molar." 99 And if the physicist 
takes no stock of this, he can embroil himself in the kind of embarassment which 
left speechless for a moment the famed astronomer-cosmologist W. H. McCrea. 
After being heard to state in a lecture that the star images seen through the 
telescopes have a strict relation to reality only insofar as they are sensations on the 
retina, he was asked in the question-answer period: "Would you also hold the same 
about the reality of the wall which you are facing?" His answer, "I am not really 
sure," speaks for itself. 10° Not even that much comment is deserved by the 
inconsistency of those astronomers (some world-famous) who after boasting of 
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their solipsism during dinner, 101 do not blush as they spend the night looking 
through their telescopes. 
Immediate direct observation of things and the certainty of that observation (or 
at least the certainty with which it can be corrected or improved) is the rock bottom 
basis not only of philosophy but of science as well. In view of this and of what 
already has been said about the true status of scientific laws, it should not be 
difficult to perceive the disingenuousness of the indignation with which miracles 
are denounced as violations of the laws of nature. The indignation is essentially a 
clever form of the strategy: attack is the best defense. But if it is impossible to start a 
march (physical or mental) with the second step, concern about the laws of nature 
should give second place to concern about man's ability to register things and 
events with certainty. And since without that ability nothing can be known about 
the laws of nature, the chief intellectual concern should be not so much about the 
possible violations of the laws of nature as about the actual violation, if not plain 
rape, of man's mind whose natural function is to know reality with immediate 
certitude. 
Such a rape is committed when individuals reporting extraordinary events, and 
in fact lay down their lives on behalf of their witness, are declared at the outset to be 
hotheaded enthusiasts, uncritical minds, or plain fakers. This is done on the 
patently dogmatic ground that nature cannot change its course. Those taking that 
ground rape their own intellect to the point of declaring that they cannot even have 
one. A startling admission of this came from such a prominent spokesman of the 
absolute unchangeability of "nature's laws" (a form of sheer materialism) as J. B. S. 
Haldane: 
If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms 
in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They 
may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound 
logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be 
composed of atoms. 102 
The defense of miracles done with an eye on physics should include a passing 
reference to meteorites. Characteristic of the stubborn resistance of scientific 
academies to those strange bits of matter was Laplace's shouting, "We've had 
enough such myths," when Pictet, a fellow academician, urged a reconsideration 
of the evidence provided by "lay-people" as plain eyewitnesses./ 03 Laymen were 
they in the sense that they had no telescopes, no training in celestial mechanics, no 
knowledge of trajectories, azimuth, right and left ascension. But they could 
register with absolute certainty that a fiery body had just hit the ground nearby 
and could unerringly distinguish its still warm stony remains as something not 
belonging to the soil around it. That such a kind of witnessing stands in its own 
right was the point recognized by a doctor on being confronted with the objection 
of a colleague who insisted that the wide-open fracture below the left knee of Pieter 
De Rudder (1822-1898), the subject of possibly the most startling cure related to 
Lourdes, could not be accepted for a fact because the two ends of the broken bone 
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protruding through the skin had not been certified by a medical commission. The 
reply of that rightly indignant physician, "it does not take a tailor to see that a coat 
is full of holes,"/ 04 contains an instructiveness that is practically inexhaustible. 
The case of sighting meteorites, however extraordinary, is not the same as the 
case of miracles. Unlike meteorites that repeat themselves, any given miracle is a 
strictly individual event that cannot be expected to occur again. Again, unlike the 
fall of a meteorite, always a purely physical event, a miracle is also a historical 
event, however physical it may be. Its verification, even in the case of a fresh 
miracle, is essentially one involving the historical method with its reliance on direct 
witnesses, on indirect observation, and circumstantial evidence. This is why 
ancient miracles as objects of historical verification are a much more difficult 
matter than are recent miracles. Only upon the latter does beat "the bright light of 
modern history," to recall a felicitous expression of that famed Jewish novelist 
Franz Werfel in his introduction to The Song of Bernadette, his memorable 
reconstruction of what happened at Lourdes. 105 
For all his certainty about the miracles of Lourdes, and for all his gratitude to 
the Lady of its Grotto and to the memory of her humble maidservant Bernadette 
Soubirous (whose body he knew to lie incorrupt in a glass casket in Nevers), Werfel 
did not become a Christian, a Catholic. As to Alexis Carrell, who received in 1912 
the Nobel Prize for his study of the rate at which wounds heal, he first went in 1903 
to Lourdes, 106 where incredibly fast healing of festering wounds had by then been 
attested for almost half a century. Yet, it was not until 1940 or so that Carrell was 
able to get rid of all his agnostic reservations and become a Christian, a Catholic, 
although long before that he had known of the powerful argument that reason 
could forge from an attentive consideration of those cures. The argument had 
already been voiced on more than one occasion when in 1909 Teilhard de Chardin 
cast it into a classic form with his powerful prose: 
If a common antecedent for the cures could only be discovered; if we 
could extract from all these authentic facts something which marks 
them off or conditions them! But we find only this: Lourdes; and it is 
not the Lourdes imagined or hoped for in the excitement of pilgrim-
ages...but it is Lourdes alone—Lourdes, a naked and objective reality, 
to which is attached a mysterious virtue, independent of anything the 
sick and the praying crowds can take there. 
If the cures of Lourdes were characterized by any family likeness, 
attached to one category of diseases or appeared under determinate 
circumstances of time or place, I might invoke with show of reason, 
some magnetism, some appropriate vibration with which the human 
body would enter into a vivifying resonance. The precise cause would 
escape me, but a certain regularity in the phenomena would assure me 
of the existence of this cause and entitle me to imagine it. But there is 
nothing of the kind...effects follow each other without apparent rule. 
These cures are distributed as if by chance, and sometimes there are 
alarming relapses. In all truth, what renders Lourdes altogether extra- 
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medical is less what occurs there than the manner in which the 
prodigies take place. If what happens there astonishes the scientists, 
the way it happens is absolutely beyond him. 107 
The purpose of this paper was to call attention to the role which the recognition 
of "naked and objective reality" (or of plain facts) plays in the philosophy that 
alone can do justice to facts be they so extraordinary as to be called miracles. The 
chief recommendation of that philosophy is that it alone can cope also with the 
facts of ordinary life as well as with the facts which science carefully isolates for its 
purposes. For even in the systematic isolation or carefully controlled conditions 
which science demands for its facts, their usefulness ultimately depends on the 
reliability of plain human witness about them. Without that witness not only the 
vast enterprise known as scientific endeavor would lose its claim to truth, but also 
the far more vast social life would be deprived of right to justice. Courts of all 
levels, governments of all jurisdiction, depend on witnesses and their plain 
witnessing" and so do laboratories. In none of those forums can a discrimination 
against plain witnessing of unusual facts be condoned or else the most important 
cases may be prejudged and the only avenues for progress be blocked. Had Oersted 
refused to believe his eyes when they noted that the magnetic needle which he 
placed under a live wire turned in a direction which he believed to be impossible, 
the discoveries of Faraday and Maxwell might not have followed as they did. The 
discovery of the world of atoms depended on Roentgen's chance witnessing the 
formation,. that was not expected to happen, of the negative image of a key on a 
photographic plate. Far more importantly, would Newtonian science have 
developed at all if Kepler had not unconditionally trusted Tycho Brahe's eyes in 
making countless naked-eye observations about the positions of the planet Mars? 
Luckily for science, it witnesses relatively rarely the brushing aside of a report 
about a really new case with the remark: "It cannot be really different from the 
thousand other cases we have already investigated." The brave reply of the young 
assistant, "But, Sir, what if this is the thousand and first case?" which after more 
than half a century is still whispered in the corridors of psychoanalysis,I 09 is 
precisely the rejoinder which is to be faced in connection with facts that fall under 
suspicion because of their miraculous character. 
The witnessing of facts is, of course, to be coupled with a willingness to face up to 
the consequences of the fact witnessed. If the author of the Book of Joshua did not 
mean an extremely dark cloud cover in speaking about the stopping of the sun "in 
the middle of the sky" and staying there "for a whole day" (Joshua 10:13), 11) then 
one has on hand astronomical consequences that even from a distance of three 
thousand years could be verified. No other biblical miracle would pose a similar 
problem. Such physical miracles as the multiplication of the bread, the changing of 
water into wine, Christ's and Peter's walking on the water, represent disturbances 
that cannot be detected from a distance of two thousand years. This would be the 
case even if they were to be contemporary events. The reason for this is not so 
much the relative minuteness of the physical effect they represent, but the 
impossibility of making the scientific apparatus ready for the event. This is not to 
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say that there would not be countless men of science ready to stand by with all sorts 
of sensors to register the physical parameters of a physical miracle, including the 
rapid healing of festering wounds, of broken bones, of collapsed lungs, and of 
lumps of cancerous tissues. But those men of science would in vain wait for an 
invitation from on High or from any of the Almighty's saintly agents. Miracles are 
not for order. They never were. 
This is the only point about miracles which puts the believer at a disadvantage. 
Humiliating it may be, but a humiliation fully consistent with the humble 
framework in which the two Covenants were offered to man across the span of 
over a dozen centuries. An insignificant corner of the earth was chosen to be the 
scene of both Covenants. The chosen recipient was a people that should seem most 
insignificant compared with the cultural, artistic, and organizational magnificence 
of great neighboring civilizations. There is, of course, a silver lining inside that 
humiliation, a silver lining which is nothing short of a miracle: a unique 
interpretation of history, human and cosmic, physical and moral, compared with 
which all other interpretations, ancient or recent, are a poor second. That 
ultimately the rise of science was sparked by that interpretation' is hardly a point 
to let drift from focus in the often theatrical confrontation of miracles with science. 
No humiliation is involved in the fact that miracles are never automatically 
overwhelming proofs. They represent the challenge of external reality, not of 
axioms of logic." 2 That true miracles are never coercive, whatever their occasional 
impact on skeptics and scoffers, is their chief recommendation. A dispensation 
would never be truly divine that would take man's freedom away because such a 
dispensation would not also be fully human. Clearly, it all depends on the 
perspective or, to use the technical term, philosophy or epistemology. That all, not 
only miracles but everything else, depends on it is implied in the recognition that, to 
borrow a forceful phrase from a famed analysis of the origins of modern science, 
"the only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing."' " What the 
author actually meant was the very opposite of the meaning which is usually 
ascribed to metaphysics: the art of bartering facts for ideas. Unfortunately, the 
author in question did not know of the only metaphysics, Aristotelian-Thomistic 
metaphysics, that begins with the recognition of facts and claims in fact that all the 
rules (categories) of man's mental operations are a distillation from his registering 
of facts." 4 
To approach any subject, be it the subject of miracles, in any other way will land 
the mind in mirages as witnessed by the despair of modern man about his intellect. 
That man will find help only from those Christians who have not lost sight, even 
for a moment, of the truly realistic epistemology. Such Christians and only such 
can fully seize their intellectual opportunity which is offered by those unbelievers 
who at least admit the fact of certain extraordinary events, though not their 
miraculous character. They are at one with T. H. Huxley who urged that 
unreserved attention be given to all facts, however extraordinary. They would 
emulate also that Huxley who, following the death of his first son at the age of 
seven, firmly declined the comfort of Christian perspectives. Huxley did so with a 
profession of faith in the facts of nature as seen by science as he understood it: 
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Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the 
great truth which is embodied in the Christian conception of entire 
surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little child, 
prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly 
wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall learn 
nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I 
have resolved at all risks to do this. " 5 
The defender of Christian miracles should, of course, be able to demythologize 
that notion of science which Huxley in the same context made an object of worship 
with his eyes fixed on the inverse square law, in obvious ignorance of its not 
entirely "scientific" provenance: 
It is no use to talk to me of analogies and probabilities. I know what I 
mean when I say I believe in the law of the inverse squares, and I will 
not rest my life and my hopes upon weaker convictions. I dare not if I 
would." 6 
But even with that demythologization of science done, the Christian defender of 
miracles must tirelessly return to them insofar as they are facts, and insist that they 
be faced with the openness of a child. He can do no more than that teenage peasant 
girl, Bernadette Soubirous, whose mental aplomb under endless questioning was 
no less a miracle than the cures her visions had triggered. To a visitor pressing her 
with doubts about those visions, she gave this reply of astonishing balance: "Je suis 
chargee de vous le dire, je ne suis pas chargee de vous le faire croire." 117 This is all a 
Christian can do about miracles. He has to reassert them as facts in all their details 
and context but he should under no circumstances confuse the skillful and honest 
presentation of facts with the art of convincing. About miracles, however factual, 
conviction is a matter of God's grace which, however, has an intimate tie to facts, 
however miraculous, that can be heard, seen and touched. It is these very terms 
that are the object of a perception which is as sensory as it is an understanding or 
episteme. A biblical proof of this is the very start of the first epistle of John, a 
casting of the entire Christian message into a realist epistemological frame: 
This is what we proclaim to you: 
what was from the beginning, 
what we have heard, 
what we have looked upon, 
and our hands have touched— 
we speak of the word of life." 8 (Italics added) 
Clearly, this kind of epistemology stands somewhere in the middle between the 
classic extremes of positivism and idealism. In positivism, the tangible facts can 
never lead to metaphysical heights, let alone to heights where the Word of Life is 
heard. In idealism, the metaphysical heights are not supposed to be rooted in that 
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reality which human touch and sight alone give access to. Only when imbued with 
a median epistemology will Christians be liberated from a veneer of sophistication 
about miracles which is but a throwback to a leery Humean scepticism. Only then 
will they instinctively avoid either ending or beginning their discussion of miracles 
with the despondent sigh, a transparent admission of an intellectual failure of the 
nerve: "Miracle was once the foundation of all apologetics, then it became an 
apologetic crutch, and today it is not infrequently regarded as a cross for 
apologetics to bear."" 19 Only when Christians will relearn to glory in their minds as 
an organ whose natural function is to have certainty about facts and things, will 
they be able to derive intellectual glory from miracles. On that certainty and on it 
alone can that intellectual platform be built which provides proper perspective 
about science, about miracles, and even about God insofar as He can be grasped by 
that reason which makes man a being created in His very image. 
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Reflections on the Death of a Monk 
JERRY L. MERCER 
Tucked away in the rolling hills of central Kentucky is Our Lady of Gethsemani 
Monastery. Founded in 1848, this austere order of Trappist monks is committed to 
silence, prayer and work. One of their ministries is a retreat house where men may 
go to renew their search for God. As often as possible, I drive the 70 miles from my 
home to the monastery for a time of spiritual deepening. Something happens to 
me at Gethsemani. It is too personal to communicate here. But when I listen to the 
chanting of the psalms, walk the grounds in silence, sit in the woods before the 
statue of Christ praying in agony, I know for sure God loves all creation. 
At some point in my retreat I spend time in a small reading room near the 
retreatant's library, browsing through books and periodicals, occasionally 
napping. Recently while there I noticed on a table several pages stapled together. I 
glanced at the words typed on the blue cover: 
Br. Elias Simpson 
1939-1970 
One With The Lord 
At first I pushed them aside without much attention. Moments later the dates 
struck me: "1939-1970." This monk died at age 31 (actually 30'/2, as I learned later). 
I picked up the thin makeshift pamphlet and began to read. What I found was an 
intriguing story of the last hours of Br. Elias's life, written by a fellow monk. I wish 
to share this story with you, along with some of my reflections on Br. Elias's 
experience. 
You should know that Elias (or Elijah) was the monastic name for Charles 
William Simpson. Born on December 15, 1939, he entered Gethsemani at age 17, 
took his solemn vows at 26, and died of cancer on June 21, 1970. The young monk 
was considered by his brothers a model of the virtue of simplicity. 
It was in the fall of 1969 that a mobile x-ray unit made its annual visit to the 
monastery. Chest x-rays indicated that two of the monks needed further diagnosis. 
One of them was Elias. Exploratory surgery confirmed that he was already 
beyond human help. Elias was frightened at first, but in a letter to his brother 
monks indicated that God was helping him. He returned to the monastery to 
continue his regular routine during the time he had left. The following account of 
his last days, focusing on the Sunday he died, is a moving one and should be read 
several times in order to gain a deepened perception. The letter was not signed; the 
community would know the author. 
Dr. Jerry L. Mercer is professor of preaching at Asbury Theological Seminary. 
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THE DEATH OF ELIAS 
1 write this to you after a very sobering and religious experience. Our 
brother Elias has passed over to his true home with the Lord. I had the 
great grace and privilege of leading the prayers for the dying, and 
watching his final moments in this world. Just two weeks or so ago we 
were all thinking that he surely had at least another year with us, but the 
Lord was growing impatient to bring him home and we didn't know it. 
"Being perfected in a short time, he fulfilled long years, for his soul was 
pleasing to God. He was caught up lest evil change his understanding 
or guile deceive his sour! For, just a week ago, he developed blood 
clots in the leg and took to bed. Then his breathing grew more 
difficult, and they said he wouldn't live through August. A day later 
they were saying July. Finally, about Wednesday, he took a sudden 
and marked turn for the worse and his breathing became extremely 
labored. The cancer was acting far faster than even Fr. Eudes 2 
 expected, and by then had entered his liver. Br. Camillus, our 
infirmarian, called me to come and sit by his bedside while Fr. Eudes 
went to get an oxygen tent to aid his breathing; it was so difficult for 
him to breathe that Br. Camillus was afraid he might slip away. This 
was Friday. I sat by his bed, held his hand and talked to him. 
He said, "I didn't expect this, but He wants it. Whatever He wants." 
I told him, "This is what you came here for; this is what you gave up 
all for. Cleave to Him with your heart in trust and leave it there in His 
hands.'' 
I began to fear that Fr. Eudes would not get back in time, because 
Elias was very pale already. But Fr. Eudes did get back, and the oxygen 
temporarily relieved his breathing. Fr. Eudes said his condition was 
grave and requested the community to take turns watching at his 
bedside. We each took an hour's watch while he steadily grew worse. His 
breathing grew more and more difficult, though he experienced little 
physical pain. He was completely resigned to God's will, and would kiss 
the cross he held—the cross so many before him had held on their 
deathbed. 
The whole community experienced the tension of waiting for him to 
expire—more than for many others who had gone before, and all were 
constantly praying for him and visiting him. The love they had for him 
was very evident. His parents in Cincinnati were notified and they drove 
down immediately. His mother didn't expect to see him since he was in 
the infirmary and couldn't be moved, but she wanted his dad and 
brothers to see him. [By special arrangement, Elias's mother and sisters 
were admitted to his room for a long visit.] 
Saturday night and Sunday morning Fr. Eudes had given Elias 
several shots to help him get some sleep. He woke twice in some fear, 
because he was experiencing fantasies that he couldn't control. Fr. 
Eudes told him to let them go and not to worry about trying to control 
them. 
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[Fr. Eudes] asked, "Are you at peace?" 
Br. Elias answered, "Oh yes, I'm at peace." 
"Then that's all that matters," said Fr. Eudes. 
Br. Elias said, "I'm very groggy from those shots." 
"It's not the shot, but your breathing that's making you groggy," said 
Fr. Eudes, "any[way] you'll get more groggy gradually until you finally 
fall asleep and wake up again with the Lord." 
"Oh, how wonderful!" Br. Elias replied. 
On Sunday, June 21st, the Lord's Day and the Day of Resurrection, 
which had been preceded by three days of bleak, black, stormy 
weather, the whole community gathered to celebrate the Eucharist 
and the Death and Resurrection of the Lord. During the Mass, Br. 
Elias awakened from his last shot in terror—the terror of dying. I am 
told that at the Consecration there was a marked change that came 
over him. Precisely at the end of the final hymn of the Mass he began 
to enter his death agony. The whole community was available, and we 
all went to the infirmary and began the prayers for the dying. Fr. 
Eudes was inside the tent with him telling him that we were all there 
and praying with him. Shortly before we got there, he had said, "Oh, 
we don't realize how good God is!" It was right after the Consecration 
that he began to say the Our Father 3 with an intensity and fervor that 
Br. Camillus said he'll never forget. Then he wanted to say it again, 
after,which he said, "Into thy hands I commend my spirit." 4 While I 
stood in the door of his room, leading the community in the prayers 
for the dying, Fr. Eudes had his head inside the oxygen tent speaking 
to him and saying prayers. Br. Elias was also saying prayers quite 
loudly and intensely, one of which was "Lord Jesus Christ, have 
mercy on me a sinner." 5 Then Fr. Flavian6 knelt beside his bed and, 
with his head also inside the tent, began to say the prayers for the 
dying to him. We finished them all, but since he was still conscious and 
breathing, Fr. Eudes prayed Psalm 26 7 for him, at the end of which he 
gave his last breath.. 
Elias's final days and last hours were a profound experience for the 
whole community. One could feel a unity and intensity of concern and 
prayer for and with him that has never before been experienced for a 
death here, and many are certain (including myself who knew him 
intimately) that he died a saint. Judging from what others have told 
me, I think the whole community experienced many graces at his 
death. Certainly I have. After his death, the sky cleared within a few 
minutes, and the sun shone brightly and brilliantly. Elias was buried 
beside Fr. Louis. 8 
One additional note of uncanny "coincidence": Br. Alan, who was 
standing near the entrance to the infirmary, told me that precisely at 
the moment Br. Elias drew his last breath, and as Fr. Eudes stepped 
out of his room and said, "He just drew his last breath," the tower 
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began to strike 12:00 high noon; at that very moment the Sun reached 
its zenith in the heavens! I leave this to your reflections, but to me, 
everything including Nature itself seemed to be proclaiming, "He is 
not dead! He is alive and in glory!"—just the opposite of what 
appeared to be happening. In addition, not only was it the Lord's Day 
of the Resurrection, it was also June 21st, literally "Sun-day," the day 
of the Summer Solstice, when the Sun "stices," "stands still in the 
heavens." 
In our Resurrection and our Life. 
I have mulled this letter over in my mind many times, and have even read it to 
my classes and some of my friends. It never fails to make an impression and always 
sparks discussion and reflection. Several things emerge from this account that can 
benefit people of faith, especially when they ponder the reality of their own death. 
ELIAS REMINDS US OF OUR BAPTISMAL VOWS: TO LOVE AND 
FOLLOW CHRIST 
The news of his physical condition hit Elias with force, but his response was 
perfectly natural and understandable. In spite of the obvious—that we all know 
people die—we normally seem psychologically ill-equipped to seriously believe in 
our own death. That Elias was a professional "religious" did not exempt him from 
feelings of terror upon learning of his own approaching death. As a monk he was 
very familiar with biblical statements on death—that on earth we have "no 
continuing city," that our final destiny is in the Kingdom of God. Had Elias been, 
say, 75 and "full of years," he may have been better prepared. But at age 30 he was 
initially dismayed and anxious. The important thing is that he was not 
overwhelmed by the diagnosis. He was able to gather his concerns and begin the 
process of reconciling them in God. 
As Elias neared his death he was seemingly consoled by the words, "This is what 
you came here for, this is what you gave up all for. Cleave to Him with your heart 
in trust and leave it there in His hands." These words seem to have been tenderly 
but forcefully spoken. Certainly the abandonment to God of mind, spirit and, 
eventually, body is the primary goal of a monastic vocation. It is also to be the goal 
of all baptized Christians. Every Christian is a stranger and pilgrim in this world. 
Every Christian moves toward complete union with God, here and hereafter. The 
advice given to Elias is for us all; that is, "Cleave to Him . . . leave it there in His 
hands." An important insight from Elias's experience is that it does not really 
matter how long a person lives if complete union with God is the final goal of 
living—and dying. Our lives are God's possession. We need only learn to follow 
Christ and love His good will for our lives. 
ELIAS'S DEATH TEACHES US TO LOVE EACH OTHER WITHOUT 
JUDGMENT, RECALLING OUR OWN HUMANITY 
The monastic community was totally loving and supportive during Elias's 
anxious times, especially in his bouts with "fantasies," or wild dreams. The 
physician, Fr. Eudes, was extremely sensitive. His only question was, "Are you at 
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peace?"—and that was answered affirmatively. On that basis nothing else 
mattered at that moment. No expectations were laid on the young monk. There 
was no role to play. He was allowed to be a human being in Christ, with a mixture 
of fears and triumphs. After all, victory over death was God's doing, not his own. 
The only requirement of a faithful person is to be open to God, which he 
apparently was. 
Too often we expect people to die without fears, fuss or doubts, notwithstanding 
St. Paul's view of death as an "enemy." In its early days, my own tradition 
emphasized dying well. It was expected that faith enabled one to meet the grim 
reaper triumphantly. I think Elias's statements and his community's perceptions 
support this view. But we must avoid a smug triumphalism, especially in cases 
where dying is a slow process. Lingering illness sometimes breaks down our 
normal defenses, and when that happens something of the deeper self comes to the 
surface. Christians should not be put off by any expressed fears, angers or 
frustrations of the seriously ill or dying. The grace of God is with them, and their 
long battle is almost over. We should rather thank God for His grace, keeping in 
mind our own limitations. 
ELIAS'S EXPERIENCE ENCOURAGES US TO FACE DEATH HONESTLY, 
TRUSTING IN CHRIST'S TRIUMPH 
Those who tended Elias were refreshingly honest about his physical condition. 
As soon as it was confirmed that he had inoperable cancer, he was told. Again as 
he neared death, the gravity of his condition was never skirted. I especially 
appreciated the following exchange between Elias and Eudes: "... you'll get more 
groggy until you finally fall asleep and wake up again with the Lord." 
A man of faith, Elias responded, "Oh, how wonderful." 
And it will be, if we take our Lord at His word that where He is now, we also will 
be one day. Perhaps one reason Christians are so apprehensive about death is that 
we do not prepare ourselves by meditating on heaven and the Kingdom of Glory. 
There are those who think we should keep the news of impending death from 
those about to experience it. I do not share this view. The thought of going to be 
with one's Lord should be a source of real strength. The idea concerning Elias—
that "the Lord was growing impatient to bring him home"—affirms a basic 
Christian teaching that all of our experiences, including death, are redeemed by 
the love and power of God. God wants us home! And that kind of sensitivity ought 
to have force in our lives. Through God's grace, our destiny is His Kingdom. For 
lovers of God, that is a happy thought indeed. 
THE CHRISTIAN'S TRIUMPH IS IN HUMILITY 
As the end drew near, Elias prayed "loudly" and "intensely." These were not 
prayers of desperation—looking for someplace to land! Rather, Elias's statements 
of resignation to God's will and his prayers, including the Our Father and the Jesus 
Prayer, blended together into an appropriate posture for entering heaven. In 
monastic thought, prayer heightens the notion of one's absolute dependence on 
God. Prayers at the time of death intensify the confessional aspect of Christian 
spirituality; that is, that we are unworthy of God except as He makes us worthy by 
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His grace. 
Salvation is always the gift of God, never the result of good works. The 
redemptive process is God's doing. In one sense He is active and we are passive. If 
everything depends on Him, then we are stripped bare before Him. If we have no 
righteousness of our own, then we must plead for the free gift of His love. In 
another sense the salvation process shows our activity as well. We are called to 
respond to the grace which is given. Prayers are expressive of our dependence and 
our soul's desire to be obedient. Our sense of the distance between ourselves and 
God is bridged by prayers of faith. These prayers provide a sense of God's nearness 
and goodness. Intense prayer at the time of death can be a sign of mature 
spirituality entering its destiny. 
OUR LIFE AND DEATH ARE IMPORTANT  TO THE LARGER BODY OF 
CHRIST 
At Gethsemani death is a community experience. Elias was loved; that is clear. 
He was surrounded by love. Death at an early age was seen neither as a tragedy 
nor a punishment (both popular notions), but as an act of grace. Remember the 
unidentified quote? 
Being perfected in a short time, he fulfilled long years, for his soul was 
pleasing to God. He was caught up lest evil change his understanding or 
guile deceive his soul. 
Such an evaluation of his life fulfills the apostolic injunction to think better of 
others than we do of ourselves. It is also a good example of the "golden rule"about 
doing unto others. 
The monks joined in the Prayers for the Dying at Elias's infirmary room. They 
were there as brothers, experiencing Elias's death as a mixture of triumph 
through Christ and battle with the force of illusion—the illusion that death is final. 
At the moment of his death Elias represented the hopes of all Christians that we 
will have pleased God and be admitted into His Kingdom. The physician and the 
abbot were inside the oxygen tent with Elias, praying the same prayer for Elias 
that he had prayed for others. This is another instance where the life of the Church 
is intertwined with the life—and death—of its members. Each of us is a microcosm 
of the whole. Each of us needs the life of the whole Church to sustain our 
individual faith and hope. 
NATURE IS A WITNESS TO FAITH 
There is an innocence in the suggestion that nature became a sign of Divine 
approval at the death of Elias. With our present understanding and control of 
weather patterns, this notion must seem odd to many moderns. Existentialist 
thought, which emerged with force during the World Wars, sees nature as a neutral 
reality, totally unconcerned with the dilemmas of human life. In biblical thought, 
however, nature often cooperates with Divine intentions. Nature seems to have a 
hidden life of its own, rejoicing in the goodness of God and even anticipating its 
peculiar destiny in the Kingdom of Glory. Although the writer leaves it for us to 
decide, we know where he stands. For him nature bears witness to the faith of the 
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Church—that things are not as they appear. The monk's body may be wrapped in 
linen and laid on evergreen boughs. Dirt may be thrown in the open grave while 
the brothers pray. But Elias has joined the great procession of the redeemed as it 
makes its way to the foot of the throne. And so will we who serve God! 
PARTING WORDS 
I am always uplifted after reading this fascinating letter. I have replayed it in my 
mind many times since I first read it on that warm spring afternoon. It served me 
well in my own struggle with my father's death. The letter has been for me an 
example of Christian care at its best. 
Frankly, I hope for such a death myself: having resolute confidence in God's 
redemptive love and being surrounded by the support of a genuinely Christian 
community. Then the last line of the Elias letter will become my last line as well: 
"In our Resurrection and our Life." I wish the same for you. 
Notes 
1. Unidentified source. 
2. Fr. Eudes Bamberger, at the time physician to the monastery. 
3. Commonly known among many Christians as The Lord's Prayer. 
4. Our Lord's words as recorded in Luke 23:46. 
5. A form of the Jesus Prayer, which is the heart of Orthodox Christian spirituality. 
6. Fr. Flavian Burns, at the time abbot of the monastery. 
7. According to the numbering system of the monastic psalter the psalm is 26; for most 
other English Bibles it is 27. 
8. Fr. Louis, better known to many as Thomas Merton. His writings continue to exert 
influence in the areas of Christian spirituality and Christian ethics. 
A Distinctive German-American Credo: 
The United Brethren Confession of Faith 
J. STEVEN O'MALLEY 
Among the "landmark documents" of the United Methodist Church is the 
Confession of Faith of the former Evangelical United Brethren Church. The 
historical antecedents to that Confession were the Confession of Faith of the 
Church of the United Brethren in Christ and the Articles of Faith of the Evan-
gelical Church, which were rewritten to produce the new Confession in 1962. The 
1962 Confession shows its indebtedness to that of the former United Brethren both 
in its title and in the use of specific phrases which were characteristic of the older 
Confession.' 
The earlier document, which was officially promulgated at the United Brethren 
General Conference of 1815, has not been the subject of historical and theological 
analysis since the era of nineteenth-century denominational historiography. The 
historians of that era were in accord in their intention to show the uniqueness of the 
Confession, but their conclusions were at times either misleading or not fully 
explicated. 2 
An examination of the old United Brethren Confession of Faith brings to light a 
long-obscure perception of the Christian faith which in its early setting had direct 
and living ties with the deeply personal witness of its adherents. How this 
document became progressively "stereotyped" and made more distant from the 
living faith of the "Brotherhood" is a concern subsequent to the question under 
focus. This first concern is to discern what made the early Confession of Faith of 
the Church of the United Brethren in Christ a distinctive German-American credo, 
one which added its own distinctive elements to the emerging pattern of American 
evangelical Protestantism. 
In reconstructing this confessional tradition, attention will be given to its 
historical context, its form and function, and to the alteration of the Confession 
which occurred in the first half century of its existence. 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA 
Henry Spayth, one of the earliest historians of the United Brethren, asserted 
without supporting evidence that the Confession was written by Philip William 
Otterbein for use in his Baltimore congregation, the Evangelical Reformed 
Church of Baltimore, and that this document, along with Otterbein's Constitution 
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and Ordinances of 1785, was the one adopted as the credo of the nascent 
movement at its meeting in Otterbein's Baltimore parsonage in 1789. 3 
In the 1814 manuscript version of the Confession one finds the primitive form 
for the document that was officially adopted by the first General Conference of the 
church in 1815. A comparison of the two brings to light differences which indicate 
that the distinctively Reformed-Pietistic character of the document was being 
eroded. In its place, denominational consciousness was emerging, and the 
amended forms of the Confession from 1815 onward increasingly show the 
tendency of the United Brethren movement to become gradually assimilated into 
the mainstream of American evangelical Protestantism. 
The historical milieu of the German AuJklarung in which the Confession 
appeared provides a perspective for assessing its distinctiveness. In Germany, the 
established territorial church orders (Kirchenordnungen) were frequently being 
overturned in favor of universalistic credos asserting a secularized "rights of man" 
ideology.4 The venerable Heidelberg Catechism, which had assumed a confes-
sional status among the German and Dutch Reformed in the era of Protestant 
orthodoxy, 5 was less frequently being expounded after 1700 in pulpit and school. 
Georg Gottfried Otterbein (1731-1800), a brother of William and a pastor in 
Duisburg, Germany, published sermons and primers on the Catechism which were 
used extensively in those homes of Germany and the American Middle Colonies 
where streams of Reformed Pietism kept alive a witness to the Christian faith when 
it was elsewhere being eroded. 6 By invigorating a theologically-informed, popular 
piety in a period of marked religious decline, the Otterbeins contributed to the 
evangelical Wing of the German Reformed Church and helped to provide a basis 
within that tradition for the "unsectarian" (unparteiisch) United Brotherhood 
movement to emerge.' 
This milieu points to several distinctives which may be claimed for the 
Confession. It exists as one of the first post-Revolutionary War credos to be 
developed by an American religious body, and it was contemporary with that 
period of United Brethren history when Otterbein was its guiding influence. 
Second, it emerged from a quite different environment than the sixteenth-century 
confessions to which the great "confessional" church bodies, the Lutheran and the 
Reformed, remain committed. Unlike these, the United Brethren Confession was 
the expression of a lay, revivalistic movement that was admittedly unsectarian and 
less polemical in tenor. While the Reformation confessions contained strongly 
polemical articles that were anti-Roman, anti-Anabaptist, and occasionally anti-
Lutheran or anti-Calvinist, as the case may be, the only polemical tone in the 
United Brethren Confession was its implicit critique of the godlessness of the 
Enlightenment Age. Its distinctive status as an unsectarian rallying point for all 
"awakened" German-Americans of differing traditions was obscured as it became 
the official credo of a new American denomination. Third, the United Brethren 
Confession is distinctive as an eighteenth-century response to the divisive, 
sectarian ferment that was a characteristic of the German-American culture. 8 The 
other major proposal to unify these divergent voices upon a new confessional basis 
was that of the Moravian leader, Count Zinzendorf. In the 1740s he proposed the 
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formation in Pennsylvania of the semi-ecclesiastical "Congregation of God in the 
Spirit," that was intended to supersede all other church traditions and would fuse a 
highly subjective piety focusing upon Christ's passion with a rigorous, hierarchical 
organization. Only a few ministers remained fitfully committed to this ideal during 
this decade. 9 Otterbein arrived in Pennsylvania in 1752, during the eclipse of this 
abortive effort. The movement which came to be associated with him reflected 
both his sense of churchmanship as a Reformed pastor and his conviction that 
awakened believers may participate in a "higher unity" in the Spirit without 
sacrificing their responsibilities to their historic churches. This outlook is first 
reflected in the records of his "Pipe Creek Conferences" (1774-1776) with fellow 
Reformed pastors of evangelical persuasion and later in the United Brethren 
movement, which included a significant number of Mennonite participants. 10 For 
Otterbein, the millennial kingdom would be a divinely-initiated "more glorious 
state" within the future of the church in history." It was the United Brethren 
Confession of Faith that gave concrete form to that hope. 
FORM AND FUNCTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The following is the text of the 1814 manuscript version of the United Brethren 
Confession of Faith, with an accompanying English translation by this author./ 2 
Die Lehre der Vereinigten Bruder in The Teaching of the United Brethren 
Christo in Christ 
Artikel 1. Im Namen Gottes beken-
nen wir vor Jedermann, dass wir 
glauben an den Einigen wahren Gott, 
Vater, Sohn und heiligen Geist, dass 
diese drey Eins sind, der Vater in 
Sohn, der Sohn in Vater, und der 
heilige Geist gleiches Wesen, mit bei-
den, dass dieser Gott, Himmel and 
Erden, and alles was darinnen ist, 
sowohl sichtbar als unsichtbar, ers-
chaffen hat, und alles traget, regiret, 
schitzet and erhalt. 
Art. 2. Wir glauben an Jesum Christus 
dass er wahrer Gott und Mensch, 
Heiland und Versohner, der ganzen 
Welt ist, dass alle Menschen durch ihn 
seelig werden konnen, wenn sie wol-
len, das dieser Jesus, fur uns gelitten, 
gestorben und begraben, am driten 
tage wider auferstanden, gen Himmel 
Art. 1. In the name of God we confess 
before every man, that we believe in 
the only true God, Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit; that these three are one, 
the Father in the Son, the Son in the 
Father, and the Holy Spirit of the 
same essence with both; that this God 
created heaven and earth and every-
thing which is within them, visible as 
well as invisible, and he sustains, 
governs, protects and supports them. 
Art. 2. We believe in Jesus Christ; that 
He is true God and true man and the 
Savior and Mediator of the whole 
world; that all men can become 
blessed through Him if they will; that 
this Jesus suffered and died and was 
buried for us, and rose on the third 
day, ascended into heaven, and will 
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gefahren, und am ji.ingsten tage, wie-
der kommen wird, zu richten die 
lebendigen und die toden. 
Art. 3. Wir glauben an den heiligen 
Geist, das er vom Vater und Sohn 
ausgehe, dass wir durch ihn milssen 
geheiligt werden, und den glauben 
erlangen, welcher uns reiniget von 
Aller befleckung des fleisches und des 
geistes. 
Art. 4. Wir glauben das die Bibel 
Gottes Wort ist, dass sie den wahren 
weg zu unserm seelenheil und seelig-
keit enthalte, das ein jeder wahrer 
Christ, dieselbe, mit den einflissen des 
geistes-Gott, Einzig und alein zu seiner 
richtschnur nehmen mtisse, und das 
ohne buse und glauben, an Jesum 
Christum vergebung der sunden, und 
nachfolge Jesu Christi, niemand ein 
wahrer Christ seyn kann. 
Art. 5. Wir glauben das die Lehre, 
welche die heilige Schrift enthalt, 
namlich der Fall in Adam, und die 
errettung durch Jesum Christum der 
ganzen Welt geprediget und verkiind-
iget werden solte. Aeussere Zeichen 
und verordnungen, namlich die taufe, 
und das gedachtnis des Herrn, in 
austheilung des brods und Weins, 
werden anempfohlen, wie auch das 
fusswaschen, wo es begehret wird. 
come again on the last day to judge 
the living and the dead. 
Art. 3. We believe in the Holy Spirit; 
that He proceeds from the Father and 
the Son; that we must become blessed 
through Him and attain unto the faith 
which cleanses us from all blemishes 
of the flesh and of the spirit. 
Art. 4. We believe that the Bible is 
God's Word; that it contains the true 
way to our spiritual welfare and hap-
piness; that every true Christian might 
receive it with the influence of the 
Spirit of God singly and solely as his 
guideline (lit. "plumbline"); and that 
without repentance and faith, without 
the forgiveness of sins in Jesus Christ, 
and without following after Jesus 
Christ, no one can be a true Christian. 
Art. 5. We believe that the teaching 
which the holy Scripture contains; 
namely, the fall in Adam and the de-
liverance through Jesus Christ should 
be proclaimed and made known 
throughout the entire world. The out-
ward signs and ordinances, namely 
baptism and the remembrance of the 
Lord in the distribution of the bread 
and wine, we will recommend, as also 
the washing of feet, where it is desired. 
It is evident that this Confession, with its grammatical errors, reproduces the 
basic form of the Apostles' Creed with the addition of a paragraph on the Bible 
and one on the "outward means of grace." 
As for its more immediate historical antecedents, the Confession bears some 
resemblance to the Anabaptist credos, of which the Schleitheim Confession (1527) 
of the Swiss Brethren is the most notable. Like the latter, it is marked by a 
non-scholastic, lay-oriented simplicity, with emphasis upon the ethical demands 
of the faith, explained in terms of "following after Christ" (Nachfolge Christy). 
Implicit in its teaching is a doctrine of two worlds, the fallen, coercive corpus 
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Christianum, and the gathered, eschatological community of the redeemed. The 
believer is the one who forsakes the former (in Absonderung) and obediently 
presses into the Age of the Kingdom, whose first fruits are to be discovered within 
the bounds of the believers' fellowship. 13 
Although the only explicit reference to Anabaptist teaching is in the final 
statement which permits different modes of baptism 14 and recognizes the practice 
of footwashing, there are other parts which reflect some commonality with the 
Anabaptist credo. For example, the Confession links "forgiveness of sins" 
(Vergebung) with "following after Christ" (Nachfolge Christi), as a clear indication 
that there is to be no one-sided, antinomian stress on justification without sanctifi-
cation. For the Anabaptist, his credo was a witness which was to be personally 
lived out in the midst of a fallen, hostile society. Is there not an echo of this legacy 
when the Confession affirms "...that every true Christian is bound to receive it as 
his only guideline," or again, "Christ shall be preached and made known through-
out the whole world" (italics mine)? 15 
The most likely link with Anabaptism is provided by Martin Boehm (1725-
1812) and other former Mennonites, notably Christian Newcomer (1750-1830), 
who participated in the United Brotherhood movement after L789.' 6  These men 
were also guaranteed full participation in the life of Otterbein's Baltimore congrega-
tion by virtue of the church constitution which he implemented in 1785. 77 
 Newcomer was willing to baptize children, while Boehm was not, and in his 
Journal he recorded that the washing of feet was practiced in connection with the 
Lord's Supper at the first General Conference in 1815. 18 The 1833 General 
Conference enacted a rule that retained the Mennonite opposition to the swearing 
of oaths, although it was not included in the Confession of Faith 19 . The provision 
"against the world" was interpreted by Mennonites to be a mandate to continue 
the wearing of simple attire. 20 One of the few existing documents reflecting the 
critical stance taken by conservative Mennonites toward the revivalist preachers is 
a book by the Mennonite Bishop Christian Burkholder of Lancaster County, 
Pennsylvania, entitled Niitzliche und erbauliche Anreds an die Jugend, von der 
wahren Busse ("A Useful and Edifying Discourse to the Young on True 
Repentance," according to the English edition of 1857.) 21 He upholds discipleship 
ethics against the revivalists' emphasis upon emotional experience, saying, "My 
experience can help you nothing, nor can your experience help me anything." 
Rather, says Burkholder, "Christ identifies the new birth with the following of 
Him . . . A follower of Christ is in his whole course of life a light of the world and 
salt to the earth .. .."22 As we have seen, the Confession balances an emphasis upon 
a conscious awareness of repentance and faith (Busse und Glauben) with a 
recognition of the need for "following after Jesus Christ"(nachfolge Jesu Christi).23 
Yet, it may be that, in practice, many United Brethren gave less attention to the 
ethical implications of Nachfolge than to the conscious experience of the 
penitential struggle (Busskampf) and rebirth ( Wied,rgeburt). 
Another historical antecedent to the Confession which gives a somewhat 
different perspective to its distinctiveness is the Confession of Faith of the Czech 
Brethren of 1535 (The Bohemian Unitas Fratrem), which was reprinted and given 
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new life by John Amos Comenius (1592-1670), the most celebrated Moravian 
scholar. 24 Comenius reconstituted the Czech Brethren and worked toward the 
dawn of a millenial kingdom which would supersede the fallen, coercive era of his 
own day. There is here no direct, personal link, as in the case of Boehm and 
Otterbein, but both traditions share in part a common historico-theological 
rootage that has been insufficiently noticed. Only Lawrence, an early historian of 
the United Brethren in Christ, suggested that the work of Comenius be regarded as 
a precursor to the movement associated with Otterbein. 25 H owever, Lawrence was 
also preoccupied with a denominational polemic with contemporary German 
Reformed historians. 26 His intention was to establish the preeminence of his 
denomination by showing how, in spirit, it was in the line of succession to the 
"righteous remnant" in Christian history—from the Waldensians and the Hussites 
to the reconstituted Unitas Fratrem under Comenius and then Zinzendorf. A 
closer examination of Comenius reveals that his work in restoring the confessional 
unity of the Czech Brethren was the direct product of his theological education 
which he received at the Herborn Gymnasium in Nassau, the noted Reformed 
school where Otterbein and his brothers studied and lectured a century later. 27 
 From the days of the great Johann Alsted ( 1588-1638), who was Comenius' 
teacher, to the time of the Otterbeins, Herborn was known throughout Europe as 
a center for non-scholastic, irenical Protestantism. It was here that both men 
acquired a taste for learning that was to be integrally related to the practice of the 
Christian life. Comenius published A Manual, or the Kernel of the Holy 
Scriptures which was to serve a similar pedagogical function for the Czech 
Brethren that the Lehre ("Teaching"), which later became the Confession of the 
Otterbein movement, served. 28 It was also at Herborn that both men received a 
vision of the worldwide mission of the church which prompted them to embark on 
divergent missionary careers. 29 Finally, the reordering of creation which Comenius 
had in view—church unity, world freedom and the conversion of the globe 
through the enveloping mission of the gospel—might also characterize the early 
outlook of the Otterbein movement. The Confession speaks of the possible 
salvation "of the whole world" (Article 2), of God's graceful intention "that all men 
can become blessed through [Christ], if they will," and of the goal that there is to be 
made manifest "one holy church" (eine heilige Gemeinde). 30 In this vein, Otterbein 
frequently implored that the Brotherhood be careful to remain unpartisan 
(unparteiische). 31 
To summarize, the form of the Confession is noted for its simplicity, brevity and 
capacity to reach quickly the marrow of Reformed Pietistic theology with a 
narrative and even poetic deftness. To this is joined an array of Anabaptist themes 
which is interwoven to produce a unified statement. In function, the Confession 
intended to assist the earnest pilgrim on the way of salvation (Heilweg) in "making 
his calling and election sure" 32 amid a hostile world of Enlightenment secularism 
on the one side and sterile theological orthodoxy, on the other. 
THE ALTERATION OF THE CONFESSION 
An indication of the manner in which the self-identity of the United Brethren in 
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Christ was being altered in its early, formative years is to observe the way in which 
its Confession was amended. The earliest version reflects most closely the unique 
blending of themes from classical Reformed Pietism with Mennonite elements, 
which was first symbolized by the personal meeting of Otterbein and Boehm. 
These themes are gradually obscured as changes and additions begin to take place 
as early as 1815, when the general conference of the new denomination placed it at 
the front of its first published Discipline. What were these changes? 
First, the earliest edition, entitled the "Teaching (Lehre) of the United Brethren 
in Christ" was changed in 1815 to the Confession of Faith (Glaubens-
Bekenntniss). The former term was the one used by Otterbein in the Constitution 
and Ordinances for his Baltimore congregation, when he wrote that the pastor 
shall "impart instruction (Lehre)" to the youth (Rule 8) and that he "shall make it 
one of his highest duties to watch over the rising youth, diligently instructing them 
in the principles of religion, according to the Word of God (Rule 9)." 33 The new 
term gave the document the preeminence befitting its new status as the official 
symbol of an ecclesiastical body, although the word "church" is not yet included in 
the title of the denomination. The arrangement of the pre-1815 version into five 
articles emphasized its function to provide points of instruction in the faith, after 
the manner specified in Otterbein's church order. 
Second, the object of Christ's saving activity was changed from "the whole 
world" ("der ganzen Welt," in the early text) to "the whole human race" ("des 
ganzen menschlichen Geshclechts," 1815). The earlier formulation allows for a 
more comprehensive view of salvation which could rightly be seen to include 
nature as well as history. Here is a theme found in Paul in Romans 8:22f and in 
Ephesians 1:10 and, more directly, it had been extensively developed in the 
"federal" theology of Friedrich A. Lampe (1683-1729), which Otterbein had 
studied at Herborn. 34 The close correlation which Lampe maintained between the 
redemptive Word and nature and history is illustrated in this citation from his 
important work, The Secret of the Covenant of Grace (Geheimnis des Gnaden-
bundes): "Since new discoveries in nature are daily being made through field 
glasses, what is it to wonder that new discoveries are also taking place through the 
increasing diligence in the examination of the godly Word, and the promised 
growth in knowledge in the last times is always being further enhanced toward 
fulfillment. "3 5 
A third strategic change which occurred in this article alters the expression of 
the human response in the covenant of grace. In line with Reformed Pietism, the 
early version tells us that the goal of Christ's saving work is the creation of new 
moral beings who are "seelig "or controlled by an inclination of heart through the 
action of the Divine Spirit. 36 This term was eliminated in 1815, and the new 
formulation merely emphasizes the need for our free acceptance of Christ's grace, 
in Arminian fashion, but without reference to the quality of life which results. 37 
 Article Three, which concerns the Holy Spirit, was likewise altered in 1815 so as to 
diminish somewhat the emphasis upon a complete spiritual and moral transforma-
tion as the goal of salvation. This change appears to reflect the growing influence 
in the Brotherhood of former Mennonites, for whom the theme of Christian 
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perfection was less significant than it had been for Otterbein, whose treatment of 
the theme reflected Reformed Pietist rather than Methodist influence. The earliest 
text simply expressed that "We must become holy through the Spirit," and that we 
"will attain unto the faith which purifies us from all blemishes of the flesh and of 
the spirit."38 In 1815, this clause was stricken and in its place appeared the 
following: "that through Him we are enlightened, justified through faith, and we 
become holy (or sanctified)."39 
Fourth, in 1815, this new article was inserted following the affirmation 
concerning the Holy Spirit: "We believe in a godly communion, (Gemeinde), the 
fellowship of the godly, the resurrection of the body, and a life everlasting. "4° This 
addition from the Apostles' Creed reflects the emerging ecclesiastical self-aware-
ness of the fledgling spiritual brotherhood. While Gemeinde was translated 
"church" in the English edition of 1819, the German context denotes a spiritual 
koinonia rather than church in the externalized sense, as in Kirche. 
The next article in the early Confession is devoted to the Bible and the final one 
to the essence of its teaching. It says that the Bible "contains the true way to our 
spiritual welfare and happiness." Scripture functions here in a hermeneutical sense 
as the path for the pilgrim to follow through the labyrinth of earlyjife en route to 
God's Kingdom. This outlook is reminiscent of the Heilweg methodology of the 
Reformed Pietists, who discerned in Scripture, with the help of their Heidelberg 
Catechism, a precisely-structured guide—sometimes referred to as a "ladder to 
heaven" (Himmelsleiter)--which every earnest believer is in the process of 
ascending. "The Bible is the source," wrote Georg Otterbein, "and the Catechism 
points out the order which is derived from this source."'" Referring to this "order 
of salvation," he exclaimed, "How beautiful it is to learn to know the order itself, ... 
what we originally were, what we have become through the fall, and what we shall 
again become through the fully gracious design of God." 42 In this tradition, the 
pastor's task is not so much the proclamation of the Word as a fait accompli; 
rather, it is to function as a spiritual counselor who escorts his pilgrims through the 
steps of the order of salvation according to the readiness for discernment that they 
manifest. It was in this vein that Johann Daniel Otterbein (1736-1804), the brother 
who was pastor of the parish of Berleburg, published a narrative of his counseling 
sessions with a condemned murderer.'" It was from this perspective that Georg 
Otterbein, pastor at Duisburg, published a primer on the Catechism that was used 
both by the German Reformed and by the earliest United Brethren in this 
country." It was also in this vein that William Otterbein instituted his rules for 
examining communicants at his Reformed parish in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to 
ascertain their readiness for participation in the Lord's Supper.'" This theme is 
further developed when, in the next line, the Confession affirms that "every true 
Christian is bound to receive it with the influences of the Spirit of God, purely and 
simply as his only guideline (Richtschnur)...." The 1819 English translation 
renders Richtschnur in a more legalistic context as a "rule." This affirmation of the 
role of Scripture was retained by subsequent revisions, including the major one of 
1889.46 
Finally, the statement in Article Five, concerning the sacraments, was made 
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into a separate article beginning in 1815. Actually, the word "sacrament" is not 
used. Instead, reference is made to the "outer signs (or testimonies) and 
ordinances" ("Aeussere Zeiehen and verordnungen'), which designates the 
sacraments not as objective means of grace, or "converting" ordinances, but rather 
as public signs of the presence of saving grace within the reborn believer. The 1815 
revision of the Confession strengthened the place of the sacraments in the life of 
the Brotherhood. Whereas the earliest statement had said that the ordinances are 
"recommended," the subsequent statements all say "they shall be used according 
to the example of the Lord Jesus among His children." 47 However, it was also 
added that "the mode and manner should be left to each one according to his 
judgment." In addition, the 1815 revision replaced "outer testimonies and 
ordinances" with the "outer means of grace"—an indication of the apparent rise of 
more traditional sacramental theology befitting a movement that was now 
acquiring a conscious churchly status. Similarly, subsequent revisions of this last 
article indicate that the practice of foot washing was also becoming less 
important. 48 
SOME CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNIQUENESS OF THE 
CONFESSION 
The document which we have examined is a major product of a little-investigated 
but formative tradition in American religious life that emerged from the 
interaction of the "Pennsylvania Dutch" culture with the revivalism rooted in the 
Great Awakening. It was conceived in an irenic milieu of Reformed and Mennonite 
spirituality that is perhaps best characterized by William Otterbein's expression 
that it was to be an "unpartisan"(unparteiisch) Brotherhood in Christ. This irenic 
temper, in which Otterbein had been nurtured in Herborn, conditioned the 
manner in which theology was articulated in word and in life among the early 
United Brethren. 
Its distinctiveness begins to appear as the early Confession is compared with its 
later revisions. Emerging from our in-depth study of the alteration of the early 
German text, it is now evident that the changes in content and expression which 
occurred as early as 1815 were in no way "minor changes of no great significance" 
as Drury had summarily concluded. 49 Instead, they possibly reflected more basic 
doctrinal matters than did the new Confession of 1889, which led in part to a 
painful schism in the denomination. 50 Although these changes in the early Con-
fession frequently obscured the visible influence of themes deriving from earlier 
Reformed Pietism, they also reflect a fluid, dynamic era in the life of the 
movement in which the issues of faith and order were widely and extensively 
discussed in the conferences of the Brotherhood. 
Not only do the early revisions of the Confession tend to detach it from its 
Reformed roots; they also were inclined to render its formulation of the faith more 
akin to the Articles of Faith of the Evangelical Association and the Articles of 
Religion in Methodism. To be sure, the "middle period" (1833-1889) was not a 
time of significant sentiment for church union with these bodies, but this growing 
doctrinal kinship would seem to be a natural occurrence at a time when the United 
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Brethren were acquiring a more definite connectional system vis-a-vis the 
Methodist model. The Evangelicals had a more Methodist-like doctrinal state-
ment and discipline from their outset, since their Articles of Faith were in large 
measure based on Ignatius Roemer's German translation of John Wesley's 
Twenty Five Articles of Religion, with the addition of an article on the Last 
Judgment that was likely derived from the Augsburg Confession. 51 Wesley's 
document was a twenty-four article abridgement of the Thirty. Nine Articles of the 
Church of England, plus a loyalty article to the American nation. 
The major points of difference between the early United Brethren Confession 
and its Evangelical and Methodist counterparts can be summarized as follows. 
The one is short and compact, consisting of seven paragraphs. It reads more as a 
narrative, reciting the events of God's saving activity with the human race, 
stemming from its reliance upon Reformed Pietism and especially Cocceian 
biblical thought, with its covenantal mode of theologizing. The other documents 
present the faith in a declarative, third-person fashion and not in a first-person, 
confessional sense. Being more scholastic in tenor, they make greater use of the 
substantial metaphysics of the early Greek Fathers, who were concerned with 
defining the essence of God and man as an ontological undergirding for the 
biblical faith. 
The recovery of the vision of the early Confession may hopefully raise the 
possibility of its transformed influence today. It embodied the piety of those who 
lived a concrete existence, close to nature and the harshness of an often unfriendly 
English cultural hegemony. 52 Its language was also vernacular, concrete, and even 
poetic in its style, with no apparent inconsistency between their vital piety and the 
only language they knew. As a theological formulation, it was not critical, 
sustained, or dominating; rather, it narrated a spirituality that was intimately in 
touch with the wisdom of a lived Christian piety and whose service it commended. 
While it did not busy itself with a rational defense of an abstract "Arminianism," 53 
 the Confession affirmed concretely that Christ's work was available to all on the 
same basis and that it might be experienced as participation in a new, "unpartisan" 
Gemeinde. As a manifesto of "New Pietism" transformed by the American 
Revolutionary epoch, it embodied a living protest against the artificiality of the 
rationalist theology and served as a vehicle for adjusting the "requirements of 
orthodoxy to the demands made by intensity, diversity, and the liberation 
experienced in Christ." 54 
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Harold Sloan and Methodist Essentialism 
FLOYD T. CUNNINGHAM 
As leader of Methodist conservatives in the 1920s, Harold Paul Sloan defended 
the divinity of Jesus against modernism. Though he sometimes associated with 
Fundamentalists, he disavowed two of their chief concerns, the verbal inerrancy of 
the Bible and the premillennial return of Christ. Sloan wanted Methodists to retain 
the cultural forms, the language and the inner experience of previous generations. 
Only on such bases, he believed, could men and women maintain a rooted sense of 
themselves and a clear view of God's purpose in the world. Sloan trusted only 
proven answers to age-old problems. He felt no compulsion to alter the 
resolutions of the past. 
After graduating from Drew Theological Seminary, Sloan served several 
obscure parishes before winning a place of leadership in the New Jersey con-
ference. For twenty years after 1915 he pastored some of its largest churches: Red 
Bank; Central Church, Bridgeton; and Haddonfield, a Philadelphia suburb. In 
1925 he began the League of Faith and Life, the main organization of the 
Methodist response to modernism, and served thereafter as its president and 
publicist. The League had at least 10,000 dedicated followers, and perhaps many 
more. Several bishops and other national leaders supported Sloan behind the 
scenes. In 1934 he became superintendent of the Camden district and two years 
later the general conference elected him editor of the denomination's most in-
fluential weekly, the New York Christian Advocate. From 1941 to 1953 he 
pastored the Wharton Memorial Church in Philadelphia./ 
After entering his first pastorate, Sloan began to perceive modernism as a threat 
to The Methodist Church and he lamented the neglect of the preaching and 
experience of new birth among fellow Methodists. When the New Jersey annual 
conference in 1913 appointed him a member of a committee instructed to review 
both Sunday school literature and the books assigned to prospective ministers in 
the course of study, Sloan found opportunity to rebuke those who emphasized 
Christian nurture over spiritual rebirth. The committee reported that the church 
was entrusted with certain inviolable doctrines: the incarnation of God in Jesus 
Christ; the supernatural works of Christ, especially his atoning death for sins; the 
resurrection and ascension of Christ; and the outpouring and continued presence 
of the Holy Spirit. The committee "heartily agreed" with the "method of biblical 
criticism." This set of "fundamentals" evidenced the primary concern of Methodist 
conservatives for the doctrine of salvation through Christ, rather than for the 
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inerrancy of Scripture or the Second Coming. 2 
After the 1916 General Conference failed to remove certain books from the 
course of study, as recommended by Sloan, the New Brunswick district directed 
him to renew his investigation into the denomination's modernism. A book, The 
Child and the Church, resulted from his efforts, and for the next four years Sloan 
mounted an assault upon Methodist modernism. Aiming to produce a confronta-
tion at the next general conference, he distributed to denominational leaders The 
Child and the Church and resolutions which the New Jersey Conference had 
passed against the course of study. He received favorable responses from across 
the country, including those of Bishops Charles B. Mitchell of Minneapolis, and 
Joseph F. Berry, newly appointed to the Philadelphia area; Clarence True Wilson, 
head of the denomination's board of temperance, prohibition and public morals; 
James R. Day, chancellor of Syracuse University; and Henry Clay Morrison, 
president of Asbury College. 3 
Meanwhile, Professor John Alfred Faulkner of Drew helped Sloan formulate 
positions to be used against the Methodist liberals. Faulkner tried to keep Sloan's 
critique of modernism on an intellectual level, while believing that Methodists 
faced a choice of modernism's lifeless rationalism and John Wesley's "apostolic 
enthusiasm."4 He feared that "in a few years Unitarians will have percolated 
through our whole structure,"5 and he became discontent with the theological 
direction of his colleague at Drew, Edwin Lewis. Liberals seemed to be "on the 
saddle everywhere." It was a "queer old world," Faulkner said, when Methodist 
ministers were "far more radical" in their beliefs than the "old Unitarians. 15 
 Because of Faulkner's warnings, doctrines which seemed to threaten the divinity 
of Jesus became the focus of Sloan's attacks. 
By the time of the 1920 General Assembly, thirty-one annual conferences had 
passed resolutions regarding the removal of certain books from the course of study 
for preachers. A commission authorized to deal with the matter, however, recom-
mended few changes. The books that were finally substituted for controversial 
ones seemed to Sloan and Faulkner no less modernist. So Sloan immediately 
prepared for the next general conference.' 
In 1922, largely because of Faulkner and the proximity of Drew, Sloan began to 
direct much of his discontent with modernism against Professor Edwin Lewis, 
who taught theology at Drew. 8 As the two men vented their concerns in letters to 
each other, Sloan admonished Lewis to refute his "naturalistic thinking" and join 
the battle against "proud-hearted unbelief." 9 But Lewis minded a different agenda. 
He explained to Sloan his intent to reach those who rejected the old supernaturalist 
reasons for following Jesus as Lord.'° But Sloan remained convinced that men 
and women needed a "fearless advocacy" of faith, not Lewis's "mediating 
opinions."" Though Lewis tried to persuade Sloan that he was as fully 
"evangelical" as any Christian insofar as he stated the faith in a constructive rather 
than defensive manner, and insofar as he was personally devoted to Christ, Sloan 
warned that "heart devotion" did not guarantee orthodox theology.I 2 
Meanwhile, Sloan progressed with his conservative drive and believed that he 
and his allies won a victory for the faith at the general conference held in June 
1924. Bishop Berry, reading the key address, affirmed the deity of Jesus, the virgin 
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birth, the Bible as the inspired Word of God, and the necessity of repentance for 
sin and justification by faith for personal salvation. Sloan himself could hardly 
have said it better. Indeed Christian Advocate editor James R. Joy reported that 
Sloan's "impassioned" appeals for the "standards of evangelical belief" had 
"carried the convention." /3 
After the conference, Sloan organized the "Methodist League for Faith and 
Life." Its initial aim was to purge modernist books from the course of study, but it 
soon focused upon seminary professors suspected of heresy. With its headquarters 
in Philadelphia, in April 1925, Sloan began publishing the League's Call to Colors 
(renamed the Essentialist in 1927). The publication maintained a sometimes 
vicious attack on modernism and supposed modernists. The League relied on the 
financial contributions of professionals and small-business proprietors, and 
received money from various sources, including manufacturing companies, life 
insurance agencies and law firms. Perhaps the leaders of such enterprises felt left 
out of the vast organizational networks transforming the national economy and 
found satisfaction in joining one devoted to renewing the kind of evangelical faith 
which they believed had built America. 14 
Sloan's cause united many theologically conservative Methodists. He was a 
leader in rallies the League held throughout the nation and his paper advertised 
anti-modernist resolutions passed by various groups.is A few Methodists hoped 
he would be elected bishop, and occasionally laypersons solicited his advice as if he 
were already one. In response to queries, Sloan affirmed that Christians might 
attend motion pictures, that Catholics were "beautifully devoted to the faith," and 
that infant baptism was consistent with the New Testament and the entire history 
of Christianity. He refused to adopt positions which deviated from the historic 
stream of Methodism. By such means he held many Methodists back from joining 
fundamentalist or holiness sects. He refused to become a demagogue./ 6 
Remaining within Methodism, Sloan sought allies among the more conserva-
tive bishops. Berry often defended him before the board of bishops. Adna 
Leonard advised Sloan on the wording of various resolutions. Sloan tried to 
persuade Leonard to head the League and later approached him about a plan to 
start a Methodist seminary committed to the denomination's stated creeds. Sloan 
considered Bishops Brenton T. Badley, Anton Bast, Frederick D. Leete, and 
Ernest G. Richardson friendly to his cause./ 7 Leete, for instance, told Sloan that he 
was also eager to save what was "most vital in the Christian religion."/ 8 Sloan 
criticized liberal bishops Francis J. McConnell, Edwin H. Hughes and Edgar 
Blake, but they generally ignored him. After the League was expanded into the 
South, a few southern bishops, including Warren A. Candler, Collins Denny and 
Horace M. DuBose, supported Sloan's efforts. Some dreamed of creating a 
denomination composed of conservatives from both branches of Methodism." 
Sloan resumed heated attacks on Edwin Lewis. In Jesus Christ and the Human 
Quest, published in 1924, Lewis had tried to present the religion of Jesus in such a 
way as to make it personally and socially appealing to modern men and women. 
He attempted to prove the divinity of Jesus on the basis of his ethical character. 20 
 Sloan tried to elicit from Drew students and from direct correspondence with 
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Lewis any evidence that his teachings were unorthodox. 21 In December, 1927, 
Sloan proclaimed that the struggle against Lewis was "the next major battlefield in 
Methodism."22 Lewis should either "return to the faith or else leave Drew 
Theological Seminary," Sloan declared, for there he robbed "young men of their 
faith."23 
Prior to the 1928 General Conference, Sloan circulated a petition calling upon 
the church to demand of its pastors, teachers and laypersons an unqualified pledge 
to uphold its creed. Though "we are tolerant of any and all opinions that do not 
strike at the essential truths of Christianity," the petition read, "we will not tolerate 
any teaching that compromises Christ and His Word." The petition criticized 
books in the course of study, indicted several seminaries, including Drew, for 
"employing professors who teach contrary to our doctrines," and criticized the 
Sunday school literature and most other material being published by the 
denomination. Ten thousand Methodists signed the petition before the general 
conference convened. During one session Sloan dramatically strode to the podium 
in order to speak on behalf of the signers and to urge the petition's adoption. He 
was quickly turned away without being allowed to make his appeal. Embittered, 
Sloan returned home to renew his attacks on Lewis and modernism. 24 
Throughout the controversies in the 1920s, Sloan recognized that his ideas 
regarding what was crucial to Christian faith differed not only from those of 
Methodist liberals but from those of most American fundamentalists. Sloan's 
criticism of modernism was that it offered a "whittled-down" Christ. His criticism 
of fundamentalism was that it made the verbal inerrancy of the Bible and the 
pre-millennial coming of Christ as important as his divinity and the possibility of 
new birth. A decisive conversion, Sloan believed, was necessary in order to change 
an individual's destiny from eternal punishment to salvation, and this was the 
central Methodist doctrine in danger of being lost. 25 
The view of biblical inspiration which Sloan defended was that of Olin A. 
Curtis. Not every word of the Bible was given directly by God, Sloan said. God 
revealed Himself to men and women in the context and language of their cultures. 
Nevertheless, Sloan declared that the Bible was inerrant in all matters essential to 
Christian faith. Since higher criticism did not directly undermine that way of 
interpreting the Old and New Testaments, it could be accepted. The Bible, Sloan 
wrote, was "God's progressive revelation of Himself," and as such some parts 
testified more nearly than others to the central Word of God in Christ. Since 
Hebrew writers lacked the full light, the Old Testament needed to be judged by the 
teachings of Jesus. 26 Sloan's idea of biblical inspiration paralleled his view of 
salvation. Both stressed the human response to divine initiative. Though he 
wanted to retain a high view of Scripture, he actually depended more upon the 
creeds than biblical authority to support his positions against modernism. This 
reflected an uncertainty among many Methodists as to how they should best 
combine historical criticism and biblical inspiration. 27 
Sloan did not at first see the theory of evolution as a threat to the biblical 
theology of creation. Faulkner believed that the theory posed no threat to 
Christianity. At one point Sloan declared himself for the teleological implications 
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of evolution, that history was proceeding toward a goal. 28 But later Sloan 
repudiated the theory. He noted the use of Darwinism to attack supernaturalism 
and to advance novel theological ideas. Too many scientists speculated on ethical 
and religious matters and endeavoured to impose their naturalism and behavior-
ism on others. Those who were truly objective would not move so readily from 
their own fields. When Darwinism "ceased to be a hypothesis" and became a 
"creed" the conflict became one between two faiths. 29 Yet such theories could 
never really touch inward faith, he declared. "The progress of science has not made 
Christ obsolete."Therefore he did not make evolution a major issue in his attacks 
on modernism.30 
Sloan's ambivalence toward premillennialism further separated him and other 
conservative Methodists from fundamentalists. Postmillennialism had encour-
aged nineteenth-century Methodists to find humanitarian ways of expressing the 
gospel, and Sloan did not criticize their efforts. In April 1922, William Bell Riley 
invited Sloan both to participate in an Indiana campaign and to speak at the July 
assembly of the "World's Christian Fundamentalist Association" in Los Angeles. 
Initially Sloan agreed, affirming his belief in every historic Christian doctrine, 
including the Second Coming. Sloan believed that the event would occur 
someday, but did not specify whether he believed that Christ would come before 
or after the millennium, or whether he believed in a millennium at all. He told 
Riley that the question was trivial and that its emphasis prevented a broader 
coalition of evangelicals. Riley rebuked him, declaring that the premillennial 
coming of Christ was "as plainly taught in Scripture as any other doctrine," and 
that to "soft-pedal" it was to "suppress" the Bible's "plain statements." 3/ 
Meanwhile San Francisco Bishop Adna Leonard reminded Sloan that Methodists 
would never support premillennialism and warned him that his participation in 
the convention would embarrass the denomination. 32 Sloan had hoped that by 
offering to swing "the whole of Pacific Methodism" behind the fundamentalist 
movement he might persuade Riley to drop his stress on premillennialism; but 
Riley refused to budge or to widen the fundamentalist fray.33 So Sloan decided 
that he would not attend the convention. He recognized Riley as a "friend and 
ally," and his influence as "vital to saving faith in Jesus Christ." but he did not 
think it wise for him to concentrate on a doctrine not truly central to historic 
Christianity. 34 
Sloan refused to alter his stands in order to suit fundamentalists. In 1931, when 
plans were being laid for a fundamentalist convention in Philadelphia, Sloan's 
credentials in it, despite his renown as Methodism's leading conservative, were 
challenged by its organizer, Charles G. Trumbull. Sloan defended his right not to 
subscribe to either the premillennial Second Coming or the verbal inerrancy of the 
Bible. The latter more than the former jolted Trumbull. In response, Sloan 
affirmed that he believed in biblical authority, but repeated his long-held view that 
the Holy Spirit had spoken in a variety of situations to writers with different 
capabilities of understanding and expression. This, he said, was the true and 
historic position of the Christian Church. If fundamentalism would return to this 
truth and refute the novel theory of verbal inerrancy, he told Trumbull, its 
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influence would be much greater. 35 Though he declined a leading part in funda-
mentalism, Sloan lectured at the Winona Lake School of Theology, spoke 
occasionally at Moody Bible Institute and was instrumental in the reformation of 
the League of Evangelical Students in 1921. 36 
Sloan felt closer to the faculty at Princeton Theological Seminary than to the 
premillennialist wing of fundamentalism. In the 1920s he encouraged Methodist 
ministerial students to attend Princeton in order to study under such men as J. 
Gresham Machen. Though Machen welcomed these Methodists, he concentrated 
his efforts on his own denomination. Princeton, Machen believed, was succumbing 
to modernism. He felt sure, nevertheless, that though "evangelical Christianity" 
might be driven out of Princeton and other citadels in the Presbyterian or 
Methodist churches, it could never be rooted out of the hearts of believers. 37 When 
Machen started Westminster Theological Seminary in 1929, Sloan suggested that 
the school's faculty include a professor of Methodist doctrine and discipline. 
Having taught theology part time at Temple University for the previous two 
years, Sloan clearly was proposing himself. But Machen was as convinced that 
Calvinism represented true Christianity as Riley of premillennialism; so he did not 
offer Sloan a job.38 
Sloan distinguished Calvinist from Wesleyan evangelicalism. Strict Calvinists 
taught that sin was inherent to human life, that God chose which individuals would 
be saved, and that the atonement of Christ reached only those so chosen. True 
Methodists, Sloan said, believed that God offered salvation through the 
atonement of Christ to all who would believe and that individuals freely chose 
whether or not to accept this grace. 39 
Because his fight was not over verbal inspiration or the Second Coming, but 
over the divine nature of Jesus and his power to transform lives, Sloan declared 
that Methodist conservatives were "fundamentalists" on a "broader basis than the 
organized movement." 40 His League of Faith and Life attracted Lutherans and 
other evangelicals without ties to either the premillennialist or Calvinist wings of 
fundamentalism. 41 Bishop Leonard proposed the word "essentialism" to differen-
tiate the Methodist movement from fundamentalism, though Curtis had used the 
term in 1907. "Essentialists," Sloan wrote, were those who believed that Christ's 
incarnation was the means by which God offered salvation to a fallen humanity 
and that the Bible was the "providentially produced and guarded record of this 
redemptive work." "Fundamentalism" was a perfectly good word, Sloan added, 
but in the recent controversy it had been taken over and distorted by Calvinists. 42 
Despite these efforts to strengthen the conservative position in Methodism, 
Calvinist fundamentalism lured some away from the denomination. The most 
notable was Harold John Ockenga, who Sloan hoped would succeed him as 
editor of The Essentialist. Ockenga had graduated from Taylor University, then 
enrolled at Princeton and followed Machen to Westminster. Though Ockenga 
continued to work closely with Sloan and the League, he came to believe that the 
crucial battle was not between Wesleyans and the Calvinists, but between true 
Christians and modernists. In order to defeat modernism, he wrote in 1930, "all 
evangelicals must unite." He described Sloan as standing virtually alone in 
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Methodism, "a true, balanced and uncompromising witness in the days of its 
apostasy."43 But the logic of Machen's Calvinism proved "irresistible." 44 To 
Sloan's sorrow, the promising young preacher left the Methodist church and 
joined the Presbyterians. By his conversion to Calvinism, Ockenga was headed 
toward leadership in post-war evangelicalism in America. 
This was only part of Sloan's woes. In the summer of 1930 Sloan suffered an 
illness that he himself called a nervous breakdown. An "obscure infection" 
accompanied severe head pains, a rapid pulse and trembling hands. 45 His contro-
versies now pressed upon him "like a continent," while his "strength and resource" 
seemed like those of a "fly." 46 His anxiety was deepened by the economic 
depression of the 1930s, which left his Haddonfield congregation struggling to pay 
a $19,000 debt, and left both his broadcasting ministry and The Essentialist in 
jeopardy. 47 The crusade against Lewis took its toll emotionally as it became 
evident that Drew's new president, Arlo A. Brown, was not about to take Sloan's 
side in the dispute, and much less appoint him to the Drew faculty. A revival at 
Ocean Grove campmeeting, conducted by evangelist Gypsy Smith, brought scores 
of ministers to the altar of prayer. Sloan described it as a "modern Pentecost." 
Perhaps it was a turning point for him. 48 
Other reasons as well prompted changes in Sloan's attitudes toward the role he 
was called to play in Methodism. After the merger of The Essentialist with The 
Bible Champion in January, 1931, he left its control to others. Later that year 
Faulkner died. Though a faithful mentor, he had burdened Sloan with his nagging 
pessimism,. Most important, Edwin Lewis's new book, God and Ourselves, seemed 
to Sloan a major return to the faith. In the book Lewis commented at length on the 
failure of Methodism, and stressed the limitations of human speculation regarding 
God in comparison to his divine revelation. 49 
The two men began to reconcile their differences. Sloan told Lewis that he 
would recommend God and Ourselves to young people who had lost their faith. 
When they met in Atlantic City during the 1932 General Conference, Sloan 
admitted to Lewis that he had come "short of the grace" anyone could expect of a 
Christian in many of his tactics, and that where he still could he would make 
amends. 50 Sloan even advised his son to attend Drew, so that he might experience 
Lewis's "vision of Christ." 51 Sloan was further astonished by the completeness of 
his agreement with Lewis's Christian Manifesto, 52 and he was also impressed by 
the book's generally positive reception. "What you have affirmed in your 
`manifesto' is what I have striven to hold," Sloan wrote Lewis; "I will honor you as 
a chosen instrument of Christ." 53 
Sloan considered his own election to the editorship of the New York Christian 
Advocate in 1936 the ultimate vindication for his ideas. 54 Sloan used his position 
as editor to promote a revival which he hoped would center Methodists once more 
upon a vital, saving faith. Upon such faith Methodists might lead the nation 
upward toward "spiritual renaissance." 55 He reported signs that revival was indeed 
on its way. Indeed the conference that united the northern and southern branches 
of Methodism in 1939 declared envangelism to be the church's primary task. 56 
 Bishop Edwin H. Hughes, once on Sloan's list of liberals, edited a book entitled 
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Are You an Evangelist?, which explored new methods of accomplishing the old 
aim of winning souls to Christ. 57 The Federal Council of Churches sponsored 
large-scale preaching missions, many of them conducted by E. Stanley Jones. 58 
 And Sloan also considered neo-orthodoxy a part of the revival. It recovered many 
essential Christian truths, he believed, even though he could not accept Reinhold 
Niebuhr's seeming equation of human finitude with evil. He tried to preserve a 
distinct Methodist viewpoint toward neo-orthodoxy, despite the parallels between 
his moral relativism and Niebuhr's Christian realism. 59 
As the war approached, Sloan found himself drawn to spiritual assurances that 
while all else gave way it could be well within his own soul. The 1940 General 
Conference decided to combine the denomination's regional papers, and to his 
great disappointment he was not selected to edit the national Christian Advocate. 
Instead, he became pastor of the Wharton Methodist Church in Philadelphia. He 
affirmed as he always had the provisions of faith. 60 Despite the horrendous evils all 
around, Sloan continued to believe that individuals who possessed faith in eternal 
verities could remain unshaken. Nevertheless, he later described the war period as 
one when "demons" seemed incessantly attacking him. 6 ' 
During the war Sloan no longer attacked modernism, which he considered 
dead, but he still blamed the war on the decline of religious convictions in the face 
of rising secular forces. Men and women, entranced by the notion that they could 
remake the world, had blinded themselves to the brutalities of Hitler. Sloan 
believed that the war was being fought to protect sacred institutions and to 
preserve free societies. But he had few illusions regarding a permanent moral 
victory. He did not preach hope or optimism regarding the future. 62 
As Sloan later saw the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union emerge, he sensed that communism was a threat to Christianity as well as 
democracy. Because communism made no efforts to change men and women 
spiritually, it ultimately would fail, Sloan believed. Rather than relying on God, 
Communists tried to find salvation in their own social schemes. He linked the 
deficiencies of the social gospel (which he had not often criticized before the war), 
to those of communism. Both the social gospel and communism, he now said, 
taught that men and women could be perfected by social engineering. He attacked 
communism with the same vengeance with which he had attacked modernism. But 
he knew that this new menace was quite out of his reach. He charged the entire 
nation to preserve Christianity against communism. 63 
Throughout the years when great change in society took place, Sloan professed 
to have consistently maintained the faith he long before had been personally 
given." His emphases were lines of defense against the enemies which seemed to 
encroach upon his faith and even threaten him personally. Sloan believed that his 
holding on to belief in the divine nature of Jesus had helped thwart the intrusion of 
modernism. By 1940, events seemed to confirm that Christians could not exist for 
long without faith in a divine Savior and in God's transforming grace. Sloan found 
theologians and bishops he had opposed coming around to his long-held beliefs. 
He sensed a revival sweeping over the country. But during the war it seemed 
obvious that the forces which threatened the collapse of Christianity and 
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civilization itself were much larger than modernism. His faith remained, but even 
he clung more dearly than he ever had to the inward assurances central to his 
Methodist beliefs. 
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Literary Structure and Unbelief: 
A Study of Deuteronomy 1:6-46 
EUGENE E. CARPENTER 
The theological themes and the literary structure of the Book of Deuteronomy 
combine to communicate the message of the book: "You shall love the Lord 
(YHWH) your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your 
might. And these words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart" 
(Deut. 6:5-6). According to Jesus this is the word of God par excellence from the 
Old Testament. He quotes Deut. 6:5-6 in Matt. 22:37 (cf. Matt. 22:34-40; Mk. 
12:28-34; Lk. 10:25-28). He also quotes Lev. 19:18 as its corollary: "You shall love 
your neighbor as yourself." 
However, Deuteronomy develops the concept and practice of neighbor love 
fully and more consistently than Leviticus or any other Old Testament book. It 
illustrates in theory and by concrete cultural scenarios the corollary of the great 
commandment. Love for God and love for other persons are enjoined con-
comitantly throughout the book. 
The word love ('ahabah) is used sixteen times (4:37; 6:5; 7:8, 9, 13; 10:12, 15; 
11:1, 13, 22, etc.). Yahweh's love for his people (eleven times) and Israel's love for 
Yahweh (five times) encompass the past, present and future purview of the writer. 
The unity of Israel and the solidarity of brotherhood are emphasized' throughout 
the material. In 3:18-20 the point is made that members of the various tribes are 
brothers. The phrase "all Israel" (01 yisrd'El) is employed twelve times and the 
word for brother(s) ('ab/ 'alkim) is found twenty-eight times (cf. 1:16; 3:18, 20; 
10:9; 15:3, 7, 9, 11). The use of the term "brother" inspires obedience to commands 
concerning relationships within Israel; it encourages the hearer to see Israel as the 
family writ large. 2 Even the King is chosen from among "your brothers" (17:15). 3 
In fact, Moses teaches that all Israel's leaders or representatives (judges, kings, 
levites, prophets) are leaders among brethren (1:18; 17:14-20; 18:1-5, 15-18). 
In Israel the concept of "caring for one's brother" influenced all of life. The 
question of Cain is answered positively in Deuteronomy: Yes, you are your 
brother's keeper. This motif regulates the suspension of debts, making loans, 
releasing slaves, dealing with perjury, foregoing interest, kidnapping, slave trading 
and the avoidance of excessive penalties (15:2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12; 19:18-19; 23:20-21 
[19-20]; 24:7; 25:3). The concern for mutual support and brotherhood among 
Israelites motivates the command for the Transjordanian tribes to commit 
themselves to the other tribes to help them receive their inheritance in Canaan 
(3:18-20). Never was an Israelite to harden their heart or shut their hand to 
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withhold what was needed by their poor brother (15:7-8). An Israelite was to let his 
Hebrew slave go free with joy (15:18), and the King was to see "that his heart may 
not be lifted up above his brethren"(17:20). Brotherly love was possible only when 
Israel loved the Lord supremely, as he had loved them: "because he loved your 
fathers and chose their descendants after them" (4:37); "because the Lord loves 
you, and is keeping the oath which he swore to your fathers" (7:8). The ideal 
community is presented by the deuteronomic writer in this way. 
But what happens to this ideal community that trusts and loves its God, to a 
community that knows that her God loves her, when an attitude of unbelief and 
rebellion arises? Deuteronomy 1:6-46 provides insight into what happened in 
Israel when such a situation arose. Paul reminds us that all of the stories in the Old 
Testament were written down so that we could learn from those lessons of faith. 
The past history of Israel, her responses in thought and acts to Yahweh's words, 
is narrated by Moses is Deut. 1:6-3:29. 4 These chapters present two paradigms 
(models) of Israel's responses to Yahweh in the face of his persistent covenant 
faithfulness. Chapter 1:6-46 is the locus classicus in Deuteronomy for Israel's 
trajectory of failure, fueled by her incorrigible unbelief and rebellious ways. After 
Yahweh's discipline of Israel (2:1, 14-15), verses 2:2-3:11 recorsi a paradigm of 
Israel's success as she conquers the Transjordanian lands. As Yahweh led, she 
followed and was successful. The structure and theology of Deuteronomy in the 
paradigm of 1:6-46 will be examined in this study. 
STRUCTURE AND THEOLOGY IN 1:6-46 
The introductory verses (vv. 1-5) of Deuteronomy can be set out in the form of a 
palistrophe 5 to illustrate how their literary structure underlies the theological 
message of Deuteronomy: 
A. What-Where: Words of Moses; in the Desert (1:1) 
B. When: Fortieth year, first day, eleventh month (1:1-2) 
C. Key theme: ALL THE LORD COMMANDED MOSES (1:3b) 
B'. When: After Og and Sihon were defeated (1:4) 
A'. Where-What: East of the Jordan; this Torah (1:5) 
This brief chiastic structure focuses on the theme of the Book of Deuteronomy. 
Its major purpose, goal and character is to communicate all the WORDS THAT 
THE LORD COMMANDED MOSES. The concentric structure places this 
theme at the center of the outline and highlights it. The words of Moses impart the 
burden of the Lord, for they are the words that Yahweh commanded to Moses. In 
a similar manner the literary structure of 1:6-46 serves to pinpoint the theological 
leitmotif of the passage. The devastating factor that destroys Israel's hope, her 
theology and corrupts her behavior is the lack of moral fortitude to trust Yahweh, 
i.e. unbelief. 
Our passage (1:6-46) reflects a symmetry that is suggestive of chiastic or 
concentric structuring, although the detailed correspondences that would indicate 
perfect chiasm or a perfect concentric symmetry are lacking. 6 However, the 
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general feature of parallelism of thought found in Hebrew poetry and narrative is 
clearly discernible. Certain key concepts occur in the central section of the passage 
(vv. 26-28), such as rebelliousness, unbelief, murmuring. These terms indicate the 
central theme of the passage. Similar ideas continue to be used throughout the 
second half of the passage (32, 42, 45). Unbelief is the generic term employed, as 
well as the key theological concept. After verses 26-28, the "hope" and the positive 
thrust of verses 6-25 are transformed into frustration and failure. A reversal of 
Israel's history occurs and thereafter her trajectory is downward. 
The following arrangement of some of the parallel thought in the passage helps 
to illustrate a few of these issues.' The major theological motif of the verses, and its 
significance for the life and worldview of Israel, stands at the center of the 
structure: 
A. go in and possess the land (vv. 6-8) 
B. triumphs and multiplication of Israel (vv. 9-12) 
C. wise leaders chosen (vv. 13-18) 
D. go up and possess the land (vv. 19-21a) 
E. do not fear the peoples (v. 21b) 
F. request for spies (vv. 22-24) 
G. good report of spies (v. 25) 
H. BUT, you were not willing, you rebelled; you did not believe 
(vv. 26-28) 
(v, 26 weld' abitem la 'alot wattamrti 'et pi yhwh 'elohekem) 
-G'. evil report of spies (v. 28) 
-F'. rejection of the spies (v. 28) 
-E'. expressed fear of the peoples (v. 28) 
-D'. land is withheld, and given to others (vv. 34-40) 
-C'. foolish choice by the leaders (v. 41) 
-B'. defeats and decrease of Israel (vv. 42-44) 
-A'. do not go in and possess the land (vv. 42, 45, 46) 
The value of seeing the literary symmetry of the passage is that one can easily 
locate the key issue of the passage. And, the character of scripture as literature, 
with carefully constructed patterns to communicate its theological message, is 
evident. A significant fact in the structure is that the specific parallel elements listed 
after the crucial verses in 26-28 are reversals of the corresponding items in the first 
half of the passage. The turn from hope, possibility and proffered blessing in the 
first section to frustration, lost opportunities and cursing in the second half 
because of Israel's response in unbelief (vv. 26-28) is instructive. Unbelief is such a 
powerful factor in skewing Israel's perception of things that both her theology and 
her behavior are affected. And, as goes theology, so goes behavior. The lens of 
unbelief through which Israel sees the world clearly focuses both her theology and 
her lifestyle. 
As noted, the parallel elements in the passage are striking because the para!lels 
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between the first and second parts of the passage are negative (reverse) parallels 
(i.e. A=-A', etc.). The trajectory of Israel's mindset and hence her behavior is away 
from blessing to cursing, from hope to frustration, from possession to loss of 
inheritance, from increase in numbers to decrease in numbers, from being given 
the land to having it violently withheld from them (1)=-D'). The extent to which 
unbelief in Israel causes a grotesque perversion of her theology and relationship 
with God is made clear in the central verses of the passage (26-27). 
UNBELIEF AND BAD THEOLOGY 
Moses charges Israel by asserting "you rebelled, you murmured, you did not 
trust" (cf. vv. 26-27). And, bad faith produces corrupt theology. Corrupt theology 
produces scenarios of despair and destructive behavior. The people's grotesque 
representation of the character and nature of Yahweh in verses 27-28 illustrates the 
claim. Because of adopting a perspective of unbelief, Israel concocts the following 
theology about Yahweh. 
Verse 27: "The Lord hates us" (besinat yhwh OtAnia). This is a charge that our 
writer will correct shortly. The verse continues, "He brought us out of Egypt to 
deliver us into the hands of the Amorites so that they could destroy us." According 
to the people Yahweh's hatred finds its outlet in delivering his people to the 
Amorites to be slain. 
Verse 28: The words of the people in verses 27-28 are in direct speech, a device 
used by biblical writers to emphasize the major issues in a passage. 8 This verse 
completes a hideous transformation of Yahweh's true intentions for bringing his 
people out of Egypt. This time the issue is the people's charge of maliciousness 
against their brethren. According to the people, their brothers have "made our 
hearts melt" (hUmagli et - lebabUrna) by the reports they have given. They have 
implied, and even asserted, that the peoples in the land are awesome and are to be 
feared. They are too mighty for Israel to conquer. But the writer will note three 
ways in which this charge is false. 
Israel has charged Yahweh falsely and maliciously. They have not only 
forgotten his great words and deeds on their behalf (1:29-33); paradoxically, they 
have proceeded to miscontrue them. The true intent of Yahweh's actions and 
words are not discernible to them because they have refused to believe. Unbelief 
has darkened their understanding. Yahweh's intent is now ambiguous to them. 
They do not have ears to hear or eyes to see because of their unwillingness to 
"read" Yahweh's plan correctly (Deut. 28:4). They have mocked him with his own 
words. Even after a show of repentance (1:41), they do not perceive things 
correctly because they will not yet seek his will rather than their own (v. 43). They 
insist upon being hot-headed and stiff-necked (cf. Deut. 10:16). Only one person in 
Israel is singled out for approval (1:36) and most readers want to identify with him. 
Caleb is considered a man of faith who will receive his inheritance. His faith 
produced action; he was ready to take the land. 
The result of Israel's failure of faith was forty years of discipline in the desert 
(2:1, 14-15). Only those could enter the land now who had not taken part in the 
distrust of and rebellion against Yahweh. As Adam and Eve's rebellion had led to 
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their violent expulsion from the promised land (Eden), now Israel's rebellion and 
lack of trust keeps them from entering the promised land (the new Eden). 
Humankind's "original" perversion of God's ways through unbelief and rebellion 
is present in Israel. And, the primeval attempt to blame one's brother, or 
companion, is repeated as well (1:28). 
The extent of Israel's failure is revealed when verses 27-28 are analyzed and 
contrasted with Yahweh's stated goals and purposes for Israel, to say nothing of 
his character. The rest of the book of Deuteronomy in its present form is an 
impassioned plea to Israel to establish themselves as God's people. The writer 
directs and encourages them to think correctly and thereby to live acceptably 
before Yahweh. Only then could they be God's people and he would be their God 
(26:16-19). 
A comparison of Israel's assertions about Yahweh and Yahweh's own claims 
shows that the words of the people are a complete reversal of Yahweh's true 
purposes and character. Chapter four sums up and comments upon the preceding 
three chapters. The issues raised in 1:26-28 are addressed in 4:37-38. These verses 
declare that Yahweh does not hate Israel (cf. 1:27); he loves them and their 
forefathers (4:37). As a result of his love for them he has chosen them (v. 37, 
wayyibha r). And, the writer drives this point home even more emphatically in 
Deut. 7:7-8: 
"It was not because you were more in number than any people that the 
Lord set his love upon you and chose you, for you were the fewest of all 
peoples; but it is because the Lord loves you, and is keeping the oath 
which he swore to your fathers, that the Lord has brought you 
out . ." (RSV). 
The basis of Yahweh's choice is love, not hate as a disbelieving Israel perceives it. 
Her perception was wrong. 
Moreover, Yahweh did not bring Israel out of Egypt to give them over to the 
Amorites (1:27); he brought them out to give the Amorites into the hands of Israel 
(4:38), for the iniquity of the Amorites was complete (cf. Gen. 15:16). Chapter 
7:17, 23, makes the point clear: 
"If you say in your heart, 'These nations are greater than I; How can 
dispossess them? . . ." (v. 17). 
"But the Lord your God will give them over to you, and throw them into 
great confusion, until they are destroyed:" (v. 23). 
The people in the land are not too strong for Israel (1:28), the Lord will drive them 
out (4:38). 
Our writer instructs Israel not to lose heart because of their brethren (1:28), but 
to take heart (4:34-35). They should respond to the good report of their brethren. 
Israel's past already had shown that Yahweh was to be trusted (Exod. 1-15). But 
following Yahweh demands a moral choice of whether to believe in his goodness 
or to lose faith because of a negative or ambiguous reading of the evidence. 
Our writer records two options that were placed before Israel. Verse 25 records 
the spies' report as, "It is a good land which the Lord our God gives us." Verse 28 
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includes another report by other spies: "The people are greater and taller than 
we ... moreover, we have seen the sons of the Anakim there" (cf. Num. 13; 14:1-38; 
14:39-45). Because of the Exodus and because of Sinai, Israel's decision to refuse 
to take possession of the land is evaluated by our writer as a moral-religious 
failure, a failure to believe Yahweh. Under these circumstances, Israel could not 
inherit the land. 
The brotherhood of Israel was to reflect solidarity. They were to be supportive 
of one another, not against one another. The model of Cain and Abel comes to 
mind as well as Adam's accusation against Eve. Yahweh's purpose from the time 
of creation was for the unity of mankind to be expressed by caring for one's 
brother (Gen. 4:8-10). The new community of God's people, Israel, was to 
experience that reality. Yahweh's purpose was that they realize that they were one 
in him, chosen for the same purpose (3:18-30; 4:38), to inherit the land and live in 
it. 
Deuteronomy illustrates theological concepts by projecting them into real 
social settings. The brothers on one side of the Jordan are, therefore, urged to aid 
those on the other side until they have received their inheritance (3:18-20). The 
pattern of the spies who encouraged Israel to take the land is to be followed (1:25), 
rather than the pattern of the spies who discouraged their brethren (1:28). It is clear 
that Israel could not know Yahweh's ways and his theology unless they would trust 
him. They were called to an intimate personal knowledge of God that depended 
upon a hermeneutics of trust and obedience. 9 Yahweh was a God who could not be 
manipulated by magic and put on display. He was a God who could be known 
intimately dnd truly only when his people would make a moral commitment to 
him. Otherwise, even his deeds and words on their behalf would be misinterpreted; 
he could not be known correctly from a perspective of unbelief. His words and 
deeds could become a stumbling block rather than a way that would guide them to 
a fulfilling relationship with their God. For Israel, knowing God and interpreting 
his words and deeds (hermeneutics) was a community affair that called for a life of 
obedience. And a hermeneutics of obedience presupposes a commitment of trust, 
not unbelief (vv. 27-28). 
The misinterpretation of Yahweh's words and deeds follows Israel's decision not 
to obey him. Hermeneutics, from a stance of unbelief and rebellion, cannot 
discern the significance or the intent of Yahweh's words and deeds. There is, 
according to this passage, a moral dimension to the knowledge of God; indeed its 
major aspect is that it is a moral religious response of trust that produces an 
accurate knowledge of God. And, faith is not merely intellectual assent, it is a 
moral act. The stance of faith helps produce a meaningful reading of God's words 
and deeds. It discerns a convincing coherence in disjunctive events, and sees 
definiteness in what is otherwise ambiguous. 
Goldingay helps us grasp the significance of the experience of the ancient people 
of God in the past. He observes, 
OT theology, then, has to hold together an involvement with the past, 
with the present, and with the future, and the attitude toward God the 
OT looks for thus embraces remembrance, faith and hope. The 
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narrative books major on remembrance, and imply that God's 
constitutive acts lie in the past; the prophetic books, von Rad suggested, 
invite Israel to turn from what God has done to what he is going to do; 
the psalms and the wisdom books express faith in (and uncertainty 
about) him in the present. But the narratives do not speak of the past out 
of antiquarian interest, but because of its relevance to the present and 
future of their readers, a relevance which is written into the story as they 
tell it; the Bible is a book thatm"though on a first level narrating the past, 
on a deeper level was speaking of the future and for the future."" 
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John Wesley and Liberation Theology: 
A Closer Look 
KENNETH COLLINS, Ph.D. 
In many respects, the opening of Vatican II by Pope John XXIII in October, 
1962, was the beginning of liberation theology. Indeed, the reforming energies of 
that council, expressed in its openness to the modern world and its problems, 
provided a favorable setting in which the frustrations of the poor and the 
disinherited could be addressed. This impetus for reform — what many in the 
Church were considering "a breath of fresh air" — continued in the call of Catholic 
bishops for a general conference in Medellin, Columbia, in 1968 to explore the 
poverty indigenous to Latin America. Medellin, in many ways the heir of Vatican 
II, has been deemed the womb of liberation theology because of its concern to 
evangelize the poor, to usher in a more just system of distribution of resources, and 
to give preference to the most needy. 
Even though the roots of liberation theology are largely Latin American, many 
contemporary theologians, ranging from Allan Boesak to Kim Yong-Bok, insist 
that this way of doing theology must not be viewed simply as the prerogative of 
Latin America, but must be seen as a vital endeavor of the universal church. For 
their part, many Methodist theologians and ministers, particularly in the United 
States and Great Britain, have sought to appropriate the genius of the "new" 
theology, and to incorporate it within the larger Wesleyan tradition. For some, this 
task has been relatively easy, for others less so. But is the theology of John Wesley 
really a useful resource for, and is it compatible with, liberation theology? 
Moreover, are there any elements in this eighteenth-century theology that could 
possibly issue in a critique of contemporary liberation theology and praxis? 
Since these two major theologies under consideration are highly developed and 
extensive, the method of this present essay will be to focus on a representative area 
of liberation theology, namely its definition of liberation itself, in order to 
determine whether or not Wesley's theological conceptions and practice are, in 
fact, salutary. 
Gustavo Gutierrez of Peru, whom many consider to be the principal Latin 
American theologian, maintains that liberation must be understood in a threefold 
sense. He writes: 
First, liberation means freedom from oppressive economic, social and 
political conditions. Secondly, liberation means that human beings take 
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over control of their own historical destiny. Thirdly, liberation includes 
emancipation from sin and the acceptance of new life in Christ. 1 
In the first area of liberation from oppressive economic, social and political 
conditions, the contribution of Wesley will be limited, chiefly due to the restrictive 
parameters of eighteenth-century political thought. Leon Hynson has argued 
cogently that the political thinking of the mature Wesley (1767-1782) revolved 
around the crucial issues of liberty and human rights. "Wesley believed that 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of worship, right to property, 
freedom of movement and of life were secured through the Glorious Revolution," 2 
 and pertained to all English. A universal application of these same rights was also 
enunciated by Wesley in the specific relation he discerned between liberty, human 
rights and natural law. Here human rights were seen as imbedded in the very 
nature of things established by the Creator and were thus deemed inalienable. A 
corollary of this was that humans must be allowed the liberty to enjoy these rights 
guaranteed by God. 
Moreover, although Wesley was an aggressive reformer, tackling the problems 
of unemployment, slavery, poverty, ignorance and war, his thought was, after all, 
more conducive to the liberal reform characteristic of his pre-Marxist age, for it 
lacked the kind of racial critique of institutional structures that has become the 
staple of liberation theology. In other words, although the father of Methodism 
was clearly a reformer, he was no revolutionary, and those theologians like Juan 
Segundo who closely identify Christianity and socialism will find little to feed 
upon in Wesley's political thought. On the other hand, those theologians who 
insist on arguing for compatibility in this area, can do so only by ignoring the 
historical problem posed in the form of Marxist thought as a watershed in political 
and economic analysis. 
II 
To insure that the fruits of the Methodist revival would not be squandered, and 
to provide some structure which could channel reforming energies into English 
society, Wesley followed in the wake of such pietists as Franke, Zinzendorf, 
William Law and his own father in emphasizing the place of religious societies in 
the discipline and renewal of Christian life. These small groups, these ecclesiola in 
ecclesia, were ranked according to spiritual progress and maturity. Thus, the 
United Societies consisted of all awakened persons; the Bands included those who 
knew their sins were forgiven, and the Select Societies embraced only those who 
appeared to walk in the light of God. 
At first glance it may seem as if these eighteenth-century communities, created 
for both personal and social reform, are quite similar to the communidades 
eclesiales de base or Christian base communities which have arisen within the 
context of Latin American liberation theology. But there are some important 
differences to be noted. First, the whole structure of Wesley's United Societies is 
reflective of the ordo salutis as seen in the spiritual progression from society to 
band to select society. But the ordo salutis, and any framework which is based 
upon it, is deemed a straitjacket by liberation theologian Jose Miguez Bonino.3 
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Second, the CBCs are decidely corporate in emphasis, often calling for the kinds 
of broad structural changes in the social order of which Wesley was only dimly 
aware. 
To be sure, these differences between the CBCs and Wesley's societies are 
significant, but the crucial distinction between them actually lies in their different 
valuations of history and human activity as agents in the process of redemption. 
Thus, if the CBCs are seen in the context of Gutierrez's second definition of 
liberation, as oppressed peoples taking control of their own historical destiny, then 
two important conclusions will follow. First, the CBCs become the locus of 
salvation, but only because they are reflective of, and closely associated with, the 
historical process which itself is deemed truly redemptive in much of liberation 
thought. As Dennis McCann wryly notes, the poor are not the objects of 
evangelism, but its subjects. 4 It is they alone who are on the very fault lines of 
history which will usher in the next vigorous activity of God. To be close to them is 
to be close to God. 
John Wesley, on the other hand, as leader of the Methodist societies, viewed 
God, not any historical process, as the efficient cause in salvation. In his sermon, 
"On Divine Providence," for example, history is clearly an instrumental cause 
utilized by the Divine agent. But in the writings of such Latin American liberation 
theologians as Leonardo Boff, Hugo Assman and Jose Miranda, the line between 
efficient and instrumental causation is sometimes blurred, and the historical 
process takes on a much greater role than Wesley's thought can allow. No doubt, 
this larger role for history in liberation theology is a function of its ongoing 
dialogue with Marxism—a dialogue to which John Wesley, quite obviously, was 
not privy. 
Second, such language as "taking control over their own historical destiny" is 
perhaps too anthropocentric for Wesley, since it appears to place the emphasis on 
human activity and independence, rather than on Divine initiative and human 
dependence. Certainly, Wesley did not deny the importance of human efforts in 
the amelioration of poverty, disease and the like, but he simply insisted that such 
undertakings be viewed as the faithful response of the Church to the ever-active 
God. In this line of thought, it is God who acts by means of the instrumentalities of 
history and human achievement. In other words, it is God who initiates and 
empowers through grace, and it is humanity which responds and becomes one of 
the principal channels for the Divine activity in the world. Wesley expressed the 
point well in his sermon on "Working Out Our Own Salvation." He wrote: "God 
works; therefore you can work ... God works, therefore you must work." 5 
III 
It should be apparent by now that the definition of liberation employed by 
Gutierrez is multi-dimensional, and is attentive, not only to the social and political 
aspects of human life, but to a personal dimension as well. Indeed, his third aspect 
of liberation entails emancipation from sin and the acceptance of new life in 
Christ. But Gutierrez's critics from the religious right have not always been 
appreciative of the inclusiveness of such a definition, since they have charged that 
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liberation theology repudiates the notion of personal redemption in favor of a 
political one. Nevertheless, liberation theology does not deny the importance of 
the individual, but believes that the extensiveness of salvation simply cannot be 
limited to this area; the social and political life of humanity must be redeemed as 
well. 
Though Gutierrez posits a threefold sense of liberation, he does not indicate 
clearly the structural relationship between the various dimensions. For example, 
what is the justification and motivation for Christian social and political activity? 
Does such concern arise from a personal sense of gratitude in response to the 
liberating activity of God, or does it come from a sensitive reading of the Divine 
activity in the world on behalf of the oppressed, and a desire to identify with such a 
movement? It is perhaps here that Wesley can be most helpful, for although his 
understanding of the extent of salvation was more limited than that of 
contemporary liberation theologians, Wesley indicated quite distinctly the raison 
d'etre for his reforming activity in the pithy phrase, "faith working by love." In 
other words, those who are in a trusting relationship with God through Jesus 
Christ are liberated enough from their own self-curvature to be able to love their 
neighbors personally, and to move beyond this level to engage in social and 
political renewal. Wesley's reforms in education, in easing the plight of the 
indigent, in attacking slavery and oppression, all grew out of his profound sense of 
gratitude to God, what Luther had referred to, in another context, as "quellende 
Liebe ." Indeed, one of Wesley's favorite texts in this area was 1 John 4:19, "We love, 
because he first loved us" (RSV). 
But Wesley's theology is helpful in another way concerning the area of 
emancipation from sin and acceptance of a new life in Christ. For although, as has 
already been pointed out, liberation theology incorporates a personal realm in its 
conception of liberation, one of its chief temptations is to focus on social and 
political constructs in its consideration of sin and evil, an endeavor which 
sometimes results in a vapid and confused doctrine of sin. For example, Elsa 
Tamez, a liberation theologian, maintains that, "Being born again, we acquire the 
ability to distinguish between life and death. We can identify those who produce 
death, the principalities and powers that govern the earth, the anti-Christs." 6 The 
danger here, of course, is that liberation theology, in its conversation with 
socialism, will be tempted to define sin along class lines, so that the dividing line 
between good and evil will be seen to run not through the center of the human 
heart, but through various classes, the oppressors and the oppressed, with the 
result that the oppressed will often fail to appreciate fully the extensiveness of their 
own evil. 
John Wesley's hamartiology, on the other hand, as expressed in his lengthy 
treatise on original sin published in 1757, underscored the universality of sin in 
language reminiscient of the continental reformers. To be sure, the Elizabethan 
Articles of Religion, to which Wesley ascribed, were informed by both the 
Augsburg and Wurtemberg Confessions with their incisive understandings of the 
nature and extent of sin. But, interestingly enough, Gutierrez's principal work, A 
Theology of Liberation, contains no discussion of the doctrine of original sin at all. 
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Such an omission is clearly disturbing, and needs to be addressed, or else one can 
easily slip into the notion that there is, after all, a privileged position untainted by 
evil from which one can survey the sin of others and, in the words of Tamez, 
"identify the anti-Christs." The problem, then, is not that evil is identified in the 
public realm, as it should be, but rests in the failure to recognize also the evil 
within. 
IV 
Even within the narrow focus of this present essay, it is obvious that there is 
both similarity and divergence with respect to Wesleyan and liberation theology. 
Therefore, all broad-stroke assessments which see an easy accommodation 
between these two theologies are precluded in favor of more tightly nuanced and 
historically-attentive treatments. Clearly, Wesley was a vital reformer, but he 
could not discern that there are, at times, structural foundations to human evils 
that are impervious to sincere preaching and expressions of goodwill. His thought 
was pre-critical because he lived, moved and had his being in a pre-critical age. He 
can neither be faulted for this, nor can his differences from a critical theology be 
glossed over in an attempt to make his thought relevant. Nevertheless, some 
Methodist scholars have largely ignored Wesley's historical context and have 
transferred, without much ado, ideas from the eighteenth century into the 
twentieth. One such scholar writes: 
If he [Wesley] did not - attain to the purview of what we call the social 
gospel or liberation theology, the founder of Methodism nevertheless 
espoused some of their crucial principles so that when these develop-
ments appeared they could be readily drawn into alliance with the 
Wesleyan tradition.' 
The reasoning cited above is especially problematic because it begs the question; 
it assumes what it should prove. No argumentation, either historical or 
theological, is offered to substantiate its sweeping claim. The mere observation of 
similar ideas, especially when they are extracted from their historical context, does 
not constitute compatibility or relevance. Saying it is so, does not make it so. 
Now there might yet be a profound dialogue, even an alliance, between 
liberation and Wesleyan theology, but such claims must be substantiated by, and 
must await, more of the kinds of historical studies conducted by both Frank Baker 
and Leon Hynson. In addition, these studies should be supplemented by a 
thoroughgoing examination of the historical context which undergirds liberation 
theology. This latter task can be accomplished, in part, by an analysis of Latin 
American history and culture, especially in terms of Iberian influence, and more 
importantly, in terms of Roman Catholicism with its communitarian ideal, and its 
different conception and evaluation of vocation in commerce and industry from 
that of Protestantism. 
To be as historically cognizant as possible is very much at the heart of what 
Outler has called Phase III of Wesley studies. This means that Wesley's theology, 
as well as liberation theology, must be understood on their own terms and in their 
own times before any sort of comparison can be made. To fail in this endeavor is to 
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allow Wesley's theology to be taken captive to contemporary ideologies and 
interests, or to allow liberation theology to be forced unnecessarily into Wesleyan 
molds. But first let liberation theology be liberation theology, and then let Wesley 
be Wesley. Only then can fruitful dialogue begin. 
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The authors, specialists in spiritual formation, clinical psychology, and Jungian 
therapy (in that order), combine their perspectives and gifts in an attempt to bring 
dreams back into the repertoire of Judeo-Christian resources for spiritual growth. 
Dreams begins where our twentieth century fears are: with the bad press dreams 
have had in the modern age. The book establishes, then achieves four goals. The 
authors intend to establish dreamwork psychologically as a holistic process which 
contributes to continuing transformation of personality along lines of holiness and 
maturity. They intend dreamwork to contribute spiritually, opening an additional 
resource and access to the supernatural, connecting inner and outer life. 
Furthermore the authors nicely connect historically, allowing us to see dreams in 
historical and cultural perspective. Finally, they insist that the dream may serve us 
theologically, especially as a contribution to the community of faith. 
In establishing dreamwork as a useful tool for moderns in their search for 
wholeness and holiness, the authors link up with the pioneering work of John 
Sanford and Morton Kelsey, both Anglican priests and counselors. Kelsey's 
Dreams: The Dark Speech of the Spirit, and Sanford's Dreams: God's Forgotten 
Language, are laid over Karl Jung's Psychology and Religion: West and East, as 
foundational works to the dreamwork technique in this book. 
The authors not only ground their dream theory in history, but also present it in 
the light of current dream research. They affirm that everyone dreams and 
typically is involved in intensive dreaming four or fives times in a single night. 
(Research indicates "at 90 minute intervals," typically). Building on Kelsey's 
breakthrough when a friend suggested that he pay more attention to his dreams 
when he was facing a particularly difficult time in his life, the present authors 
suggest, but never demand, that any of us may find life enriched and helped if we 
learn to use the content of our dreams. 
Some of the key guidelines for dreamwork include paying more attention to the 
most vivid, memorable dreams which linger in memory over several days, weeks or 
years, and looking for the "meaning" of the dream which is usually quite beyond 
the "literal" events which may have made up the dream. To assist in this more 
global use of the dream, the authors offer a four-stage grid through which to lay 
hold of the significance of a dream. They call the sequence TTAQ. (1) TITLE the 
dream, often asking "What title would the dream want me to give it?" (2) THEME 
analysis states the issues or urgent themes that might be seen in the dream. (3) 
AFFECT asks what the dominant feeling or emotional energy was which occurred 
during the dream or lingers with the dream memory. (4) QUESTION focuses on 
the lingering probe the dream poses, having asked a question of the dreamer. 
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Nearly one third of the book is devoted to thirty-six dreamwork strategies which 
unfold in direct relation to most of the chapters. The pastor, therapist, spiritual 
director, or confidant will encounter dreams as they listen to people's stories. Now, 
with this book, they are likely to raise the issue of dreams and possible dreamwork 
as a question when any major life decision or trauma is the occasion for 
consultation. 
The book will be useful to all faith traditions which regard the human being in 
global, holistic terms. It will offend those religious traditions which follow the 
Gnostic distinction between the mind which can be trusted, and the body with its 
suprarational feelings, intuitions, and biology, which cannot. 
The book would have been even more useful had the authors devoted a chapter 
to dealing with the linkage between "Rapid Eye Movement" dream studies, and 
sexual arousal which tends infallibly to accompany REM dreaming. While the 
authors wisely suggest that erotic dreams or sexually explicit dreams should be 
looked at for their larger than sexual meaning, they leave many people baffled at 
the nocturnal dream-accompanied arousal patterns which are more than 
common. They omit, too, the research-based discovery that dreaming is essential 
to sanity and that sleep deprivation leads inevitably to disorientation and perhaps 
to the mood-swing episode. 
DONALD M. JOY, Ph.D. 
Professor of Human Development and Christian Education 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Fitzmyer, Joseph A. The Gospel According to Luke. Anchor Bible, vols. 28, 28a. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981, 1985. 1600 pp. ISBN 0-385-00515-6 (vol. 
1), ISBN 0-385-15542-5 (vol. 2). 
This review marks the appearance of the second volume of Fitzmyer's 
majesterial commentary on the Gospel of Luke. This volume deserves careful 
attention by pastors and teachers who work seriously with the New Testament. 
Fitzmyer brings to his task a rich background in linguistic and historical aspects 
of Semitic studies from his work at the Catholic University of America. This 
commentary contains relevant background information. Fitzmyer has the rare 
ability to use the results of a rigorous, thorogoing historical study to illumine the 
theological meaning of the final text. 
This commentary is primarily concerned with the theological meaning of the 
text. All who regularly use biblical commentaries know the frustration of endless 
discussions regarding sources, historical reconstructions, and the history of the 
tradition. Of course, such issues should and must be addressed; but the value of a 
commentary for use within the church is ultimately judged by its sensitivity to the 
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theological and pastoral issues that face persons who work within the community 
of faith. Fitzmyer's aim is to explain the meaning of the Gospel of Luke "for 
twentieth-century readers." To this end he uses various methods at his disposal, 
including form criticism and redaction criticism. But he is primarily concerned to 
interpret individual passages in Luke's Gospel in terms of their contextual function 
within Luke-Acts as a whole. 
The value of Fitzmyer's work on Luke involves much more than simply his 
commentary on the text. His discussions of the difficult critical issues surrounding 
the Gospel of Luke are among the most thoughtful and thorough to be found 
anywhere. Fitzmyer's analysis of these issues is both original and balanced, and 
even the discussion of these critical issues is related to the meaning of the Gospel of 
Luke for the church. Moreover, the bibliographies, both in the Introduction and 
throughout the commentary, are thorough and represent various theological 
perspectives (including the evangelical). 
This work has its weaknesses. For instance, the literary dimensions of the text 
which have recently been highlighted by the discipline of literary or narrative 
criticism receive very little attention. Further, the reader senses that at certain 
points much more could be done to relate individual passages to their function 
within the whole of Luke-Acts. Yet these problems are relatively insignificant in 
light of the tremendous values this commentary affords to those who use it. 
DAVID R. BAUER, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor of English Bible 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Webber, Robert E. The Church in the World: Opposition, Tension, or 
Transformation? Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1986. 
333 p. $11.95. ISBN 0-310-36601-1 
Robert E. Webber is associate professor of theology at Wheaton College and 
the author of several books, including Common Roots, The Secular Saint, and 
Secular Humanism. In The Church in the World, Webber provides a historical 
analysis of relations between the church and the world from New Testament times 
to the modern day. He then discusses theological strengths and weaknesses of the 
various church-world models concerning the role Christians play in political and 
social issues. As Christians progressively become aware of the church's social 
responsibilities in the world, Webber provides a timely study of church and society 
issues. 
Like H. Richard Niebuhr's classic work entitled Christ and Culture, Webber 
presents models or types representative of how Christians deal with the relation-
ship between the church and the world. Although Webber draws upon Niebuhr's 
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work, Webber undertakes a more comprehensive look at the church-world issue 
than did Niebuhr. Webber places greater emphasis upon the biblical basis for 
debate, and he includes contemporary attempts to remodel classic Roman 
Catholic and Protestant traditions, for example, those which see the relationship 
between the church and the world as one of "opposition," "tension," or 
"transformation." 
Webber takes an ecumenical approach in the assessment of contemporary 
viewpoints concerning the role of the church in the world. For example, he 
indicates elements from an evangelical background in the social gospel movement 
as found in such men as John Wesley in England and Jonathan Blanchard in 
America. Without diminishing significant differences between Christian groups, 
Webber recognizes the contributions from and areas of agreement between the 
Roman Catholic Church, the World Council of Churches, and the World 
Evangelical Fellowship. 
Webber warns that concrete "structures of existence," which are created by God, 
may be the context through which adverse spiritual powers work to produce evil in 
the world. Structural realities through which life is experienced include political, 
economic, educational, intellectual, religious and moral structures. Christians 
should concern themselves as much with these structures of existence of "principali-
ties" as the diabolical influence of evil "powers." Webber draws upon Jacques 
Ellul's book entitled The New Demons to describe four "new gods": secularism, 
scientism, nationalism and political ideology, and economic utopianism. Webber 
suggests that these four provide an adequate (although not exhaustive) back-
ground for the study of the church-world issue today. 
Webber concludes by noting that in the twentieth century, with its "global 
village," a new unanimity between the various Christian traditions is being formed. 
This "convergence of thought" theoretically pertains to the primary role the church 
must play in addressing social issues. However, Webber provides little practical 
consensus as to how the church is to address those powers that exercise their 
influence through the various structures of existence. Nevertheless, Webber's study 
of the church-world issue challenges Christians to reevaluate their relationship to 
the world and, correspondingly, to act responsibly in the world. 
DONALD A. D. THORSEN, Ph.D. 
Instructor in Theology 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
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Knight, Douglas A. and Gene M. Tucker, eds. The Hebrew Bible and Its Modern 
Interpreters. Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1985. xxvii, 516 pp. $22.50 
($14.95). ISBN 0-8006-0721-X 
Douglas A. Knight is professor of Old Testament at the Divinity School, 
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. Gene Tucker is professor of Old 
Testament at Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. 
These two scholars serve as contributing editors of this volume. 
Four series of books are planned to mark the 1980 centennial of the Society of 
Biblical Literature. The preface to this volume indicates the ambitious nature of 
these series (forty volumes are projected for the four series). "The Centennial 
Publication Program aims to scrutinize the history of biblical scholarship as well 
as the very diverse roles that the Bible has played in North American culture"(p. xi). 
This book, edited by Knight and Tucker, is one volume of a trilogy in the series 
The Bible and Its Modern Interpreters. The three contributions planned for the 
Bible and Its Modern Interpreters examine the results of research on the Hebrew 
Bible (present volume), early Judaism, and the New Testament since 1945. The 
fifteen chapters of this first volume analyze the current state of biblical studies in all 
of the standard areas and in the important subdisciplines and cognate studies. The 
authors suggest future trends for research on the Hebrew Bible. 
The explosion of cross-disciplinary approaches to and perspectives on the study 
of the Old Testament and, likewise, the multiplication of methodologies and 
hermeneutical viewpoints, make a volume like this one indispensable. The purpose 
of the present collection of essays is to present a general, but comprehensive, 
discussion of all of the major trends in Old Testament studies since 1945. These 
contributors successfully complete their task by surveying the state of studies on 
the Hebrew Bible from all of the relevant perspectives. The book does not intend to 
break new ground, but does report on the new ground that has been broken. 
Although the book does not examine current issues in great detail (Dever's chapter 
on Syro-Palestinian and Biblical Archaeology comes close), the contours of 
present approaches and methodologies toward the Old Testament are discernible. 
The contributors present the following chapters: (1) Israelite History (Miller), 
(2) Syro-Palestinian and Biblical Archaeology (Dever), (3) The Ancient Near 
Eastern Environment (Roberts), (4) Criticism of Literary Features, Form, 
Tradition, and Redaction (Knierim), (5) Exploring New Directions (Cully), (6) 
Israelite Religion (Miller), (7) Theology of the Hebrew Bible (Coats), (8) The 
Pentateuch (Knight), (9) The Historical Literature (Ackroyd), (10) Prophecy and 
the Prophetic Literature (Tucker), (11) The Wisdom Literature (Crenshaw), (12) 
The Lyrical Literature (Gerstenberger), (13) Legends of Wise Heroes and Heroines 
(Niditch), (14) Apocalyptic Literature (Hanson), (15) The Hebrew Bible and 
Modern Culture (Harrelson). Several maps and an index of modern authors 
complete this study. A major contribution of this timely collection of essays is the 
extensive bibliography located at the end of each chapter. The chapters help the 
reader understand how the major bibliographical items have contributed to the 
topics under discussion. 
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All of the chapters are helpful and relatively well done. The strength of the 
volume, however, lies in its treatment of recent methodologies and approaches to 
interpreting the Old Testament that would not have appeared in a work such as 
this fifteen to twenty years ago. Those topics worthy of special attention and 
special mention deal with the "new directions" in the study of the Hebrew Bible. 
Robert C. Culley (pp. 107-189) discusses many aspects of poetics, such as discourse 
analysis, narrative analysis, structural analysis, symbol, forms of discourse, and 
text; folklore, anthropology and sociology. Gerstenberger treats lyrical literature 
and brings many interdisciplinary and integrative insights to bear on this genre of 
literature. Susan Niditch deals with the genre of legends, heroes and heroines. 
Harrelson discusses the influence of the Hebrew Bible on culture, and notes briefly 
the modern self-consciousness of biblical studies of the cultural interplay between 
the Old Testament and culture. 
Rolf Knierim's attempt to bring all of the "new directions" of perspective and 
method under the umbrella of "historical criticism" helps to relate the new 
concepts of literary criticism, sociology and anthropology to the standard 
historical-critical approach. But, at the same time, he fails to recognize the different 
presuppositions held by some of the recent hermeneutical approaches. It appears 
that he is trying to pour too much new wine into old wineskins. How can, for 
example, new literary criticism be reconciled with redaction criticism? How can the 
new stress on the unity of the text in narrative criticism be absorbed by a source 
theory approach that threatens to atomize the text? 
The book accomplishes its purpose; it does provide the reader with an informed 
guide to the status questionis in the research of the Old Testament in 1985. At the 
time of writing this review, the book is still on the cutting edge for reference works 
of this kind. One could have hoped for a discussion of the impact of the use of 
computer technology for the study of the Old Testament text. This new 
development needs to be addressed. 
The book is written for Old Testament scholars, but scholars from several cross 
disciplines, such as sociology, literary criticism, anthropology, philosophy, 
psychology and linguistics will find an entree into the Old Testament in these pages 
relevant to their research. The many integrative cross references to other disciplines 
and cognate studies indicate a positive move toward an integrative reading of the 
biblical text. This work is an invaluable reference tool for anyone who wants to 
know the development of Old Testament studies during the past forty years. 
EUGENE E. CARPENTER, Ph.D. 
Professor of Theology 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
The Asbury Theological Journal 97 
Kaiser, Walter C., Jr. Toward Old Testament Ethics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1983. xii, 345 pp. $16.95, hardback. ISBN 0-310-37110-4. 
One of the most neglected areas of Old Testament research during the past 
century has been inclusive studies in Old Testament ethics. Only six such 
monographs have appeared within the past one hundred years. Of these six, only 
three have been in English. The three English titles were published between 1883 
and 1912 and have become quite dated in the advance of Old Testament 
scholarship. Since then the literature in the field has been largely piecemeal and is 
scattered in numerous individual essays. An updated synthesis has been long 
overdue. 
This is the challenge to which the author committed himself in this book. It is the 
third in a trilogy of books which includes the designation "toward" in the title 
written by Walter Kaiser, acadernic dean and professor of Old Testament and 
Semitic languages at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. The author is aware of 
the enormity of the task in undertaking a general treatment of the ethical content of 
the Old Testament and he only claims for this work that it is a pioneering effort to 
update the discussion and to point out the more important issues and the 
fundamental structures of the theme. 
The book is organized under five major sections. The opening section raises the 
methodological problematic for an Old Testament ethic and proposes solutions 
related to the revelatory character of the old covenant. The second section 
discusses the major moral texts contained within the Pentateuch. The general 
content of Old Testament ethics is then surveyed in part three. Common objections 
to the alleged inferior level of Old Testament morality are answered in the fourth 
section. The book closes with a final chapter on the significance of Old Testament 
law and ethics for Christians under the new covenant. 
Against those authors who insist that the Old Testament is marginal as a source 
for Christian ethics because of its wide diversity of ethical values which are rooted 
in the cultural situation of the ancient world, and contrary to other authors who 
wish to make only indirect use of the ethical imagery and broad ethical witness of 
the Old Testament for informing Christian conscience, Kaiser contends that the 
ethical content of the Old Testament provides propositional norms for behavior 
which are prescriptive for the church and transferable to the modern situation. He 
is critical of a residual Marcionism which still affects Christians today, evidenced 
by an all-too-ready willingness to minimize the significance of the Old Testament 
for Christian faith. A thesis which permeates the book and which comes to fullest 
expression in the final chapter is that the moral law of the Old Testament is the 
foundation for New Testament ethics and that Christians have a continuing 
obligation to that norm. 
Readers who are less interested in questions of methodology and more 
concerned to acquire a basic understanding of Old Testament ethics will find Part 
III (pp. 139-247) of the book most helpful. Wesleyan readers in particular will 
resonate with the author's premise that holiness is the controlling motif which 
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provides the cohesive center for the variety of Old Testament ethical norms. This 
central theme is shown to permeate the various dimensions of personal, marital 
and social life. 
Kaiser writes as an evangelical Protestant and generally comes down on the side 
of conservative viewpoints on such contemporary issues as capital punishment, 
just war and the expression of human sexuality. He is not unaware of problems 
with these stances, however, and addresses biblical critiques to inappropriate and 
sinful exercises of these functions. 
This book is a welcome addition to evangelical scholarship in the area of Old 
Testament studies in general and in Old Testament ethics in particular. It assists the 
reader to grasp the more significant moral teachings and to view them within a 
holistic context. Indexes of Hebrew words and scripture references, along with 
extensive footnoting which documents classical and recent literature in the field, 
are helpful for further study. Intended to be comprehensive rather than thorough, 
it provides a doorway of entry into Old Testament ethical themes which can then 
be pursued in more depth by reading the numerous individual essays which have 
appeared over the years. 
FRED D. LAYMAN, Ph.D. 
Butler-Valade Professor of Biblical Theology 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
William R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch. A Commentary on the Letters of 
Ignatius of Antioch (Hermeneia - A Critical and Historical Commentary on the 
Bible, ed. Helmut Koester; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985). xxii, 305 pp. 
$34.95. ISBN 0-8006-6016-1. 
Schoedel's commentary on the letters of Ignatius of Antioch in Hermeneia 
continues the tradition of Handbuch zum Neuen Testaments (HNT) by including 
commentaries on selected portions of the non-canonical literature of early Christ-
ianity in a commentary series on the Bible. With the publication of this volume, 
Hermeneia has provided the scholar of Christian origins with the first full-scale 
commentary on the Ignatian writings since that of Walter Bauer (Die Brieft des 
Ignatius von Antiochia and der Polykarpbrief[Die Apostolischen Vdter, 2; HNT; 
Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr-Siebeck, 1920]), recently revised by H. Paulsen as HNT, 
18 (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr-Siebeck, 1985). In both scope and detail, Schoedel's 
work surpasses not only that of Bauer/ Paulsen but also the only other English 
language commentary of this century, that of Robert M. Grant, Ingatius of 
Antioch (The Apostolic Fathers, 4; Camden: Nelson, 1966). 
The method of the commentary is to begin with an extensive status quaestionis 
which establishes the parameters within which the commentary is to be focused. 
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William Schoedel, professor of religious studies at the University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign, demonstrates his scholarly acumen as he reexamines the 
major critical questions of lgnatian scholarship. Beginning with the problem posed 
by the three recensions, he reviews the consensus structured by Lightfoot and Zahn 
in favor of the middle recension as well as the modern challenges to that consensus 
by Weijenborg, Ruiz-Camps and Joly. Schoedel finds the work of the more recent 
authors less than convincing and builds his commentary on the text of the middle 
recension as edited by Karl Bihlmeyer, Die Apostolischen Voter: Neubearbeitung 
der Funkschen Ausgabe, 2d ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher (SAQ 2.1.1; Tubingen: J. 
C. B. M oh r-Siebeck, 1956). Reservations about specific readings in the Bihlmeyer 
text are discussed in detail in the notes. 
In the review of recent studies, Schoedel takes a number of positions, supported 
by his analysis in the commentary, which mark a departure from many earlier 
studies of the letters. Three in particular are noteworthy. (1) Schoedel argues 
convincingly that Ignatius is to be viewed not as a proto-martyr but as a bishop 
(however defined) who had lost a power struggle within the church at Antioch and 
had been delivered to the Romans by his own community. (2) The trip to Rome 
was a major effort in public relations. Ignatius was accompanied„and/ or preceded 
by messengers who alerted communities to his arrival and argued, apparently 
successfully, for Ignatius' perspective on the situation at Antioch. (3) Schoedel 
demonstrates that Ignatius is thoroughly party to the Hellenistic intellectual and 
social synthesis and that his gnosticism is to be understood in that context. This is 
made obvious by the number of allusions to and parallels with Classical and 
Hellenistic-Jewish writers indicated in the commentary. 
A cautious, judicious analysis of Ignatius' theological perspective (pp. 17-31) 
concludes the introduction. Here Schoedel takes specific themes and traces them 
through the letters (concept of God, eucharist, unity of the community, the nature 
of ministry, flesh and spirit, flesh and blood, faith and love, hope, passion and 
resurrection, eschatology, attaining God and imitation of Christ). These motifs are 
developed as functions of controversies in which their author found himself 
embroiled or interested. 
At this point further elaboration of the socio-cultural significance of Ignatius' 
method and developing perspective would have been helpful. The autobio-
graphical tendency and corresponding minimal appeal to Scripture (either Old or 
New Testament) for authentication of his assertions would suggest the fluid status 
of Christian theology and theological method, as well as evolving group structures, 
at the time of the composition of this corpus. Here a dialogue with the work of 
Pierre de Labriolle, La Reaction paTenne, 2nd ed. (Paris: Artisan du livre, 1948) 
and Robert Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1984) could prove illuminating. Any analysis of Christian 
structures and ideology which relies exclusively on Christian documents tends to 
read later conditions back into the text. Schoedel can rarely be accused of 
anachronistic reading of his documents. He is definitely aware of this material but 
does not make explicit the implications of his analysis of Ignatius for the social and 
intellectual configuration of Antiochene and western Anatolian Christianity. 
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There is much here to correct the anachronistic and triumphalistic reading of 
Ignatius promulgated by most handbooks of early Christian studies. 
The commentary which follows is solidly philological and historical. Within the 
structure of the Hermeneia series, every significant issue presented by the text is 
discussed. Schoedel is always in dialogue with writers who have investigated facets 
of Ignatius' writings and thus expands upon the status quaestionis of the 
introduction. However, the commentary makes contributions beyond the mass of 
grammatical and historical data presented to elucidate the text. Especially helpful 
are the analysis of doctrinal and political issues in tension, the identification of 
parallels with other authors and the significance of those parallels, the careful 
attention to rhetorical devices, the examination of epistolographical techniques 
and suggestion of their importance for understanding the text, and the continuous 
awareness of the context in which Ignatius is writing. 
Thus the scholar is provided with an essential reference point for all future 
research on the letters of Ignatius, the enigmatic Bishop of Antioch, as well as a 
model commentary on a patristic text. 
DAVID BUNDY, Ph.D. 
Ass't Professor of Christian Origins/ 
Collection Development Librarian 
Asbury Theological Seminary 


